The recapture of Raqqa on October 20 has been widely hailed as a victory against the Islamic State (IS) and a major turning point in counterterror efforts. Yet the fight against extremist groups is not over, and local authorities and international actors alike have serious questions to consider about how to stabilize the region through inclusive governance, reconstruction, and transitional justice. 

Four experts examine these questions. Please join the conversation by adding your thoughts in the comments section. 

A Kurdish Model of Governance

Nicholas A. Heras

Nicholas A. Heras, Middle East Security Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Follow him on Twitter @NicholasAHeras. ‏​

Raqqa has fallen. Ready or not, the United States is now wading knee-deep into the stabilization part of its mission to counter the Islamic State (IS), the success of which will be based on whether the partners that it empowers on the ground are capable of ruling. 

The vehicle for these military operations against the fearsome heir to al-Qaeda has been a sociopolitical movement nurtured by an obscure, mainly Kurdish party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), mainly known for its close ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-listed terrorist organization. Yet, the United States finds itself entrusting the stability, security, and trusteeship of the reconstruction over one-third of Syria’s territory to just such an unlikely coalition. After over three years of partnership with the United States, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is entrusted to govern in the Islamic State’s wake together with the Democratic Federal System, the political organization to which it responds. 

Herein lies the challenge and the opportunity for the SDF. It has been built from the ground up, organically, to reflect northern and eastern Syria’s communal diversity and history of inter-communal violence. However, the intellectual underpinning of the SDF governance is the Democratic Confederalism theory first proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, who is considered the leader and inspiration of the PKK. Ocalan’s theory was written as a series of essays in 2005 in response to inter-ethnic violence, mainly between Arabs and Kurds, which afflicted northeastern Syria in 2004. His ideas are given form, and are literally the governing framework that is replacing the Islamic State and serving as the partner for U.S. stability efforts. And now the SDF must show, despite its origins in the mind of Ocalan, that it is not what Turkey fears it to be: a dangerous vehicle for the PKK to target Turkey and threaten regional stability. 

To date, in Manbij and Tabqa, and perhaps soon also in Raqqa, the SDF’s model has worked, to keep the peace and support local councils so they can oversee the long road of recovery. But past performance is not necessarily future success, and the SDF must continue to govern inclusively, responsibly, and with respect to the social realities of the communities that join it, so that no one party can make it a safe haven for terrorism to strike U.S. allies. General Raymond Thomas, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, had it right when on July 21 he told the audience at the Aspen Security Forum that the SDF was ready to govern responsibly in the wake of the Islamic State, but the SDF must demonstrate that it truly is a paradigm-changing model for the future political order of Syria, and worthy of the trust that he and the United States have put in it.

Difficult Justice Questions

Nadim Houry

Nadim Houry, terrorism and counterterrorism director at Human Rights Watch. Follow him on Twitter @nadimhoury.

After four years of the Islamic State’s control, the new rulers of the devastated city of Raqqa have a long and overwhelming to-do list. One of the urgent tasks is to reestablish a functioning judicial system that can provide justice for victims, prosecute dangerous IS suspects, and tackle the numerous property and personal disputes that have arisen during the conflict.

Compared with the immediate concerns of demining and reestablishing water and electricity, justice may appear less urgent, but that would be a mistake. Raqqa’s future stability hinges on the ability of authorities to provide justice so victims do not seek revenge and so that those who are perceived to have worked with or assisted the Islamic State do not get collectively punished. It is a daunting challenge with no simple answers. Right now, the task is left to newly established local courts that have well-intentioned judges and lawyers but few resources, limited legitimacy, and serious due process issues.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the U.S.-backed Kurdish-Arab coalition that retook Raqqa, announced that they will hand over day-to-day control of the city to the Raqqa Civil Council. The council’s current plan is to join the decentralized autonomous system established by the Kurds in three northern Syrian cantons, most commonly referred to as Rojava. Rojava authorities have encouraged what they call a “bottom-up” approach to justice, with locally established people’s courts handling civil and criminal cases. Following the practice of other towns retaken from the Islamic State, the Raqqa Civil Council announced on October 22 that it was setting up a new people’s court for Raqqa city and the surrounding countryside. It will tackle criminal as well as civil cases, notably property disputes that arose during the Islamic State’s presence.

While there has been no comprehensive assessment of these courts’ operations, the few studies done suggest that they suffer from lack of professionalism, including a paucity of trained prosecutors and judges. Some critics have also complained that the locally dominant Democratic Union Party (PYD) has politicized the courts.

Terrorism cases are not handled by the people’s courts but by the People’s Protection Court, which has a presence in Qamishli and Afrin. In July, before Raqqa was retaken, this court had handled more than 700 terrorism cases in Rojava, applying a counterterrorism law adopted by the local legislative council of Rojava in 2014.1 There are major concerns about due process, with suspects denied the right to a lawyer and to appeal their sentences. Detainees complained about lengthy pre-trial detention and not being able to challenge the evidence against them. Yet, in a positive step, the Rojava authorities have abolished capital punishment, including for terrorism cases.

Meanwhile, there is no strategy to deal with the many foreign nationals who joined the Islamic State or the families of the organization’s Syrian members, many of whom are living in camps for internally displaced people. While many of the women and children are not officially under arrest, they are de facto held in the camps and have no idea about their future.

It is easy to criticize these local courts. They operate with very little material and human resources and do not meet basic due process guarantees. Yet, for now, there is no other alternative, as the Syrian government’s courts are rife with torture and due process issues. Instead, more international effort could help improve these courts to ensure the rights of detainees and address the question of trials of foreign nationals.

1. Interview with a judge on the People’s Protection Court, Qamishli, July 2017.

Piecemeal Reconstruction

Samer Abboud

Samer Abboud, Associate Professor of International Studies at Arcadia University and a fellow at the Center for Syrian Studies, University of St. Andrew’s, Scotland. Follow him on Twitter @samer_abboud.

As the Syrian conflict shifts decisively in favor of the regime and its allies, discussion of reconstruction has assumed greater prominence. However, a large-scale, national reconstruction program with buy-in from major local and regional actors is virtually impossible. Western states are unwilling to fund reconstruction as long as Bashar al-Assad remains in power and the regime is incapable of marshaling the financial resources needed to fund a national program. The uneven nature of violence in Syria means that some areas are virtually inaccessible. And in Damascus most discussion of reconstruction is focused on urban areas, rendering the rural and peripheral areas invisible as well. Syrian reconstruction is certain to be geographically uneven, piecemeal, haphazard, and de-linked from a larger national program. Since the central government lacks the financial resources, long-term strategic planning, and institutional capacity to affect reconstruction throughout the country, local authorities will plan and implement projects and are unlikely to have central government support. 
 
These are just some of the obstacles facing the administration led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that has taken control of Raqqa after the withdrawal of the Islamic State’s forces. In Raqqa, as in other Syrian cities, the feasibility of reconstruction will depend on the local authorities’ ability to marshal national and regional resources. This will entail, among other things, ensuring access for aid groups, incentivizing a return of Syrian capital, and securing financial resources for essential social services, such as health care and schooling. 

This is all easier said than done under normal circumstances, and those facing the Raqqa authorities today are extraordinary. The SDF has proven itself adept on the battlefield and has been successful in absorbing local Arab tribes into its power structure, but it remains a Kurdish-dominated force and acts as such. The tripartite powers—Turkey, Russia, and Iran—that have assumed suzerainty over Syria are united in their distrust of Syrian Kurdish political expansion and are unlikely to easily facilitate resources into the city. Moreover, the looming conflict between the regime and Kurdish-led forces makes the situation in Raqqa even more precarious and likely to discourage outside organizations or businesspeople from rushing into the city. The local authorities will have much more to contend with than the already daunting task of reconstructing a city so devastated by violence.  

Raqqa’s reconstruction is thus intimately bound up with the future of Syrian Kurdish aspirations, and as a major population center it will pose the most serious test of Kurdish attempts to stretch their autonomy over larger areas of northeastern Syria. This raises the political stakes around the city’s reconstruction and ensures that even though the Islamic State may have been defeated and expelled from the city, residents’ suffering may nevertheless continue.

The Future of Counterterrorism Efforts

Colin P. Clarke

Colin P. Clarke, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an associate fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)-The Hague. Follow him on Twitter @ColinPClarke.

With the Islamic State (IS) ousted from its Raqqa headquarters, it may seem inevitable that its caliphate is coming to an end. But even as the group’s state-building project is essentially defunct, it remains a dangerous clandestine terrorist network with transnational connections and the ability to use parts of Syria as a base to launch attacks against the West.

In some areas of Syria, the U.S. and its allies are in a race against time to beat the regime to specific locales throughout the country, ostensibly to consolidate territorial gains and prevent a power vacuum, but also to prevent Iran from controlling the corridor between Tehran and Damascus. Denying territory to Syria’s Assad regime also prevents it from gaining critical leverage in future political negotiations.

And while Raqqa has been retaken, further complications await the U.S.-led coalition. It remains unclear who or what will provide security and governance in Raqqa, which was liberated by a U.S.-backed militia comprised of both Syrian Arabs and Kurds known as the Syrian Democratic Forces. The local population is predominantly made up of Syrian Arabs, many of whom are fearful that Kurdish militias will stay—one occupier seemingly replaced by another. Local fears were not lessened when conquering troops unveiled a massive banner of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist group with ties to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a militia fighting with the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Additionally, fighters loyal to IS remain throughout eastern Syria, including around Deir Ezzor and Mayadeen. These cities could prove to be difficult places from which to dislodge fighters, particularly if militants continue to operate clandestinely until the group is powerful enough to regroup along the Euphrates River Valley, where some remnants of the group still control an estimated 4,000 square miles of territory.

It may be difficult for the United States to keep its allies interested after the caliphate has collapsed. The Islamic State still has between 6,000 and 10,000 fighters between Iraq and Syria. In addition, myriad violent non-state actors, including al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Tahrir al-Sham, remain active throughout Syria. 

It is now time for the U.S.-led Coalition to figure out what its next counterterrorism steps should be, even as it continues to work toward stabilizing the country and navigating the path toward a political settlement with the other major powers involved—Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, to name a few. Though the Syrian civil war is far from over, achieving a negotiated political settlement is a necessary step in limiting the ability of IS to regroup and plan attacks from ungoverned swaths of the country.