Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Proliferation Analysis
    Talks With North Korea
    Jon Wolfsthal April 16, 2003

    The announcement that the United States, North Korea and China will hold talks next week in Beijing over North Korea's nuclear program is a welcome development and an apparent victory for the Bush administration's decision to oppose direct, one-on-one talks with Pyongyang.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Summary of Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs
    April 15, 2003

    Syria is one of several states in the Middle East, including Israel and Egypt, that has pursued a chemical and biological weapons program. Syria's program began in 1973 with the transfer of chemical weapons equipment and supplies from Egypt shortly before the October 1973 War with Israel. We provide a brief assessment of Syria's chemical and biological weapons capabilities, followed by an overview of the weapons programs of other relevant countries drawn from Deadly Arsenals.

     
  • Event
    Asian Views of the North Korea Crisis and U.S. Policy
    Michael D. Swaine April 9, 2003

    Forum examined views and strategies of five concerned powers - South Korea, Japan, Russia, China and the United States-towards resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    President Bush on Iraq's Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons Arsenals
    April 8, 2003

    President Bush described the dangers from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that he hoped to eliminate in his State of the Union speech on January 28, 3003. "The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax -- enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hadn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it."

     
  • Op-Ed
    How Will the Iraq War Change Global Nonproliferation Strategies?
    Joseph Cirincione April 1, 2003 Cairo
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The Roots of Terrorism
    April 1, 2003

    The Bush administration believes that a regime change in Iraq will revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In his speech at the American Enterprise Institute, George W. Bush argued that toppling Saddam Hussein will deprive Palestinian suicide bombers of a wealthy patron, which will alleviate the threat of terrorism in Israel and allow for the rise of a democratic Palestinian government that strives for peace. The president promises "to seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace. And the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity." He would be wise to start now.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Corporate Nation Building
    March 31, 2003

    The administration seems to be establishing a new corporate model for post-war reconstruction efforts. There has been some talk about involving the United Nations in these efforts. But the administration is putting their money in a very different place. "At least to start, we intend to handle the big jobs ourselves," a senior administration official said. They have put almost all the emphasis and funding for humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in corporate hands: $1.5 billion in contracts to private companies, while only $50 million has gone to a small number of non-governmental groups. Officials intend to use Iraq's oil revenues and funds seized from Saddam Hussien's bank accounts to fund these corporate contracts.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Origins of Regime Change in Iraq
    Joseph Cirincione March 19, 2003 Paris, London, Brussels

    Long before September 11, before the first inspections in Iraq had started, a small group of influential officials and experts in Washington were calling for regime change in Iraq. Some never wanted to end the 1991 war. Many are now administration officials. Their organization, dedication and brilliance offer much to admire, even for those who disagree with the policies they advocate.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The View From Turkey
    March 19, 2003

    The following essay was provided by Mustafa Kibaroglu. Dr. Kibaroglu is assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. President George Bush's plans to achieve regime change in Iraq were vastly complicated by Turkey's decision not to allow U.S. troops to stage operations in country. Although U.S. statesmen claim the decision is not important, Turkey's position has serious implications for the potential success of the war plans of the "coalition of the willing."

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The Cook Report: An Eloquent Protest Against the War
    March 18, 2003

    "Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term-namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target," said Robin Cook, former UK foreign secretary and leader of the House of Commons as he resigned his post in protest against the Iraq War. "It probably still has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for 20 years, and which we helped to create? Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam's ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors?"

     
  • Op-Ed
    Bush's Nuclear Revolution
    George Perkovich March 13, 2003 Washington, D.C.

    The Bush administration's new "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)," announced in December, is wise in some places, in need of small fixes in other places, and dangerously radical in still others.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Program in Natanz
    March 10, 2003

    Multiple sources now confirm that Iran has an operational uranium-enrichment facility located in Nantanz, 200 miles south of Tehran. In late February, Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency visited this facility, which will be placed under international inspection. The plant is currently equipped with 160 new gas centrifuges, with parts reportedly in place for an additional 1,000 machines. Iran has plans to eventually operate the plant with a total of 5,000 centrifuges. According to the Washington Post, when this plant is completed in 2005, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for several bombs a year.

     
  • Event
    Prospects for India-Russia Security Relations
    March 7, 2003

    A seminar by Dipankar Banerjee, Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Hidden Motives on Russia
    March 4, 2003

    Congressman Duncan Hunter writes in the March 4, 2003 Washington Post that U.S. non-proliferation efforts in Russia need to be refocused and to come under better oversight to ensure money is not wasted in the future. For once on the issue of cooperative threat reduction, Congressman Hunter is right. Despite his record of undermining U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of Russian weapons to other countries and terrorists, Congressman Hunter points out correctly that greater congressional and executive oversight and attention to U.S. threat reduction efforts are needed.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Not engaging N. Korea is like handing it a loaded weapon
    Rose Gottemoeller February 27, 2003 Brussels
     
  • Op-Ed
    The New American Colonialism
    Joseph Cirincione February 23, 2003 Paris

    There will certainly be a regional reaction to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but it will not be a wave of democratic revolutions. We just have to look back at the previous efforts of empires with the best of intentions -- the British, the French, and the Germans -- to understand what happens when Western nations try to bring "civilization" to the Middle East on the points of their bayonets.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Why Pollack is Wrong: We Have Contained Saddam
    February 21, 2003

    Ken Pollack is a gifted analyst. But in his lengthy February 21 New York Times op-ed, he assembles a house of cards to prove that (1) Saddam Hussein may soon get a nuclear bomb, and (2) if he does, we cannot deter him from using it. For Pollack to be correct, all of Saddam's efforts to build a bomb must work perfectly and all of our efforts to thwart him short of war must fail miserably. Here are six of his key errors:

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The Arab World is Seething
    Miriam Rajkumar February 20, 2003

    Arab governments and citizens are incensed at the policies of the United States toward the Middle East. The anger cuts across age, economic, social and intellectual spectrums, and it has reached alarming levels. Recent visits to the region by Carnegie experts confirm that there is little appreciation for the Bush Administration's position among the people of the Middle East.

     
  • Policy Outlook
    Beyond Arms Control: How to Deal with Nuclear Weapons
    Rose Gottemoeller February 19, 2003 Washington, D.C.

    Nuclear arms control is often considered not worth the effort now that the Cold War is over. But the nuclear threat is anything but over. Several thousand strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert in U.S. and Russian arsenals; many more are insecurely stored. Moscow and Washington must pursue innovative reduction efforts.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Tenet Offers New Theory on Proliferation Threats
    February 12, 2003

    CIA Director George Tenet offered a dramatic redefinition of the proliferation problem in testimony to Congress February 11, 2003. Over the past two years, administration officials have discarded major elements of the global non-proliferation regime, rejected negotiated solutions and engagement and ignored major developments in North Korea and Iran. Now as former critical situations turn into crises, Tenet warns that the non-proliferation regime is in trouble. Here is Tenet's new explanation of why.

     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

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  • Toby Dalton
    Senior Fellow and Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Toby Dalton is a senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Nicole Grajewski
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Nicole Grajewski is a Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research examines Russian and Iranian policies in the global nuclear order, with a particular focus on Russian nuclear strategy, Iran’s nuclear decision-making, contestation in the non-proliferation regime, and nuclear deterrence.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

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  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

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  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Lindsay Rand
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Lindsay Rand is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Carnegie in 2022-2023.

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  • Todd Sechser
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Programm

    Todd S. Sechser is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program and the Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds Jr. Discovery professor of politics and public policy at the University of Virginia.

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  • Anne Stickells
    Pre-Doctoral Stanton Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Anne Stickells is a Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Lauren Sukin
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dr. Lauren Sukin is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program and an assistant professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie Europe

    Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow with the Nuclear Policy Program and Carnegie China.

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