The proliferation of unconventional weapons is the most serious national security threat the United States faces today. While chemical weapons can kill hundreds of people and biological weapons can potentially kill thousands, nuclear weapons are incomparably dangerous in scale of destruction and strategic impact.
The historic events in Libya, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea have raised several key questions that help frame the proliferation debate over the future direction of U.S. non-proliferation policy.
The Bush administration, in the face of increasing criticism that it misled the public and Congress about the threat posed by Iraq's weapon programs and the ease of the occupation, last week began a broad defense of the decision to go to war in Iraq. Below we present key excerpts and commentary on the administration's major points. They are: 1) the war was a continuation of Clinton policy; 2) everyone thought Saddam had illicit weapons; 3) officials just repeated what the intelligence agencies told them; 4) they never said the threat was imminent; and 5) they never asserted an operational link between Al Qaeda and Iraq.
This is an extraordinarily important moment for the United Nations. Before attention is lost in the controversies over the war itself and in the challenges of its aftermath, the United Nations must capture, clarify and publicize the record of international inspections in Iraq: for itself, for member governments and for the public.
The testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9 adds valuable insight into four key intelligence controversies: the role of DOD Undersecretary Douglas Feith's special intelligence unit, and allegations of an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection, mobile bio-weapon labs, and Iraqi efforts to procure uranium. In order to avoid future intelligence failures on the scale of September 11 and the war in Iraq, the independent commission to investigate Iraqi intelligence - or another of the several intelligence inquiries that currently exist - must make a deeper probe into these misrepresentations and mistakes. We present excerpts and analysis of Tenet's testimony below.
The pace of developments in nuclear proliferation over the past 18 months is unprecedented, and it is hard for even dedicated experts to keep track and make sense of all the latest developments. Yet with all the developments, from Libya to Pakistan to North Korea, several questions have emerged to form the core debate over the future direction of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Recent events in Pakistan and Libya are directly affecting the Bush Administration's approach to North Korea's nuclear program. The disclosure of A.Q. Khan's elaborate efforts to uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons technology and the decision by Col. Khadaffi to abandon his WMD programs have reinforced the Bush administration's perception that their tough approach is paying dividends.
In a February 23 speech, President Bush asserted what has become a common defense of his decision to go to war with Iraq. All nations saw the danger, he said, but only he had the courage to act. It is true that many nations believed that Iraq likely retained some undeclared chemical or biological weapons. But few thought the danger so grave and immediate as to require war over containment and intrusive inspections. In the UN Security Council, France was the most outspoken opponent of the rush to war. For their opposition, the French were ridiculed and reviled by many Americans, with the Congressional leadership going so far as to remove "French" from the fries and toast on Capitol Hill menus. One year later, rereading the French position, even the most ardent Franco-hater should admit they owe France an apology.
In the past few weeks we have witnessed remarkable changes in some of the most difficult and dangerous global nuclear proliferation threats. Rather than heading toward military conflicts, the United States seems to be moving toward negotiated solutions that could end the nascent nuclear weapons programs in Iran, Libya and possibly also North Korea.
Like an investor watching his returns plummet, President Bush is rebalancing his proliferation portfolio. The huge cost of the Iraq war and his sinking poll ratings seem to have convinced the president that he has invested too heavily in military operations and unilateral initiatives and that it is time to move some political capital to international organizations and cooperative ventures.
On Wednesday, February 18, senior foreign ministry officials from India and Pakistan concluded their first round of renewed talks amidst a remarkable spirit of bonhomie: India's Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan's President Musharraf are getting along, transportation links have been re-established, cross-border terrorism in Kashmir has diminished significantly, and, arguably most important to the people, the Indian cricket team will soon play in Pakistan after a thirteen-year hiatus. The process is genuinely amicable. Genuine peace will be the hard part.
So far, efforts to unravel why both British and American intelligence were so wrong about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have ignored one crucial fact: while governments on both sides of the Atlantic were getting the picture wrong, United Nations inspectors were getting it largely right.
President Bush’s February 11, 2004 speech on non-proliferation was a step in the right direction in pursuing a stronger, more effective and more international nonproliferation policy. Many of the initiatives, if implemented, will increase the ability of the United States and the international community to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. It remains to be seen, however, if the President’s strong words will lead to greater funding for and greater international cooperation by the United States on critical non-proliferation efforts.
12:15 – 2:00 p.m. David Kay, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Robert Litwak to speak at Carnegie
On the one year anniversary of secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation
to the UN Security Council, we are re-posting Project Director Joseph Cirincione's
analysis of the secretary's remarks at that time.
(Originally posted February 5, 2003) Secretary of State Colin Powell calmly
detailed before the United Nations Security Council US evidence of Iraq's failure
to comply fully with UN disarmament orders. While the secretary focused on Iraqi
deception, most nations remained fixed on the threat. They did not hear any
new evidence that the danger from Iraq was urgent or severe enough to justify
the extreme step of authorizing an invasion and occupation of an Arab state.Within
the Arab world, the editorial opinion of the Jordan Times was typical:
the speech "did not amount to convincing evidence…that Iraq presents
any real or imminent danger." The Times argues that the US charges "can
only be answered by allowing the UN inspectors the time, resources and support
neede to carry out their mandate."
In early January, my Carnegie Endowment colleagues and I released a report detailing systemic flaws in U.S. intelligence and decision-making regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.
Beginning in mid-2002, however, the official statements of the threat shifted dramatically towards greater alarm regarding certainty of the threat and greater certainty as to the evidence. This shift does not appear to have been supported by new, concrete evidence from intelligence community reports-at least those now publicly available. These statements were picked up and amplified by congressional leaders, major media and some experts.
Prior to 2002, many national and international officials and experts believed that Iraq likely had research programs and some stores of hidden chemical or biological weapons and maintained interest in a program to develop nuclear weapons. The debate that began in 2002 was not over weapons, but over war. The issue was whether Iraq's capabilities and its failure to cooperate fully with UN inspections by adequately accounting for its activities posed such a severe threat as to require military invasion and occupation in early 2003.
It's been a poorly kept secret for several years that Pakistan helped develop nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and probably in Libya. For the United States, however, Pakistan's help in the war on terror has been more important than its peddling of nuclear technology to rogue states.
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