On October 16, 2002, the Bush Administration announced that, in meetings earlier this month, North Korea admitted that it has a uranium enrichment program. With this announcement came very few details about this newly-disclosed program. Statements from the administration, alongside reports from the media, have allowed us to piece together some of the missing details. Still, significant information about this program remains unknown. The implications of North Korea's disclosure depend on the details of the program, ranging from its origins and level of development to the regime's willingness to close it down.
Moves by North Korea to restart its nuclear reactor program and by Iran to build advanced nuclear facilities to produce weapons-grade materials, threaten to blow the lid off long-standing nonproliferation efforts. The developments show that the approach being pursued by the current administration for preventing the spread of nuclear arms has failed and needs immediate adjustment.
For the first time in U.S. history, a president will deploy a major weapon system without knowing whether it will work or not. Exempting the missile defense program from required weapons procurement rules, President Bush will rush to deploy interceptor rockets in Alaska without any operational tests and after failing almost half of their preliminary development tests, including the last one. With every missile defense program behind schedule and over budget, all available evidence indicates that the Alaska system cannot work. Whether one is for or against this program, everyone should be troubled by the way the president is proceeding.
The U.S. administration has convinced most journalists and world leaders that it will soon attack Iraq. The rhetoric is escalating and so are military movements. There are now 60,000 U.S. troops on the border of Iraq and 45,000 more could fly in with short notice to marry up with pre-positioned equipment. Leaked plans detail a ferocious, short war to isolate, then topple Saddam Hussein. Arab leaders publicly oppose a war, but news reports indicate their quiet support. President George Bush seems ready to let loose the dogs of war at any moment. Which is precisely why he will not have to.
North Koreas decision to restart its plutonium production reactors creates an immediate crisis for the United States and its allies in the region. This event threatens to recreate the tense standoff that nearly led to war on the Korean peninsula in 1994. This dangerous decision by North Korea seems a transparent move designed to bring the United States back to the negotiating table and resume a direct dialogue with Washington. Although the Bush administration is unlikely to see this move as an opportunity to engage the North Koreans, the United States should move quickly to negotiate with Pyongyang to secure a total ban on North Koreas nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
The seizure and subsequent release of North Korean scud missiles bound for Yemen on the high seas is a dramatic development, but the export of missiles from North Korea to Yemen should come as no surprise. North Korea has sold Yemen Scud missiles before, and the U.S. imposed sanctions against North Korea for such commerce just this past August. Despite U.S. concerns, however, there is nothing illegal about the sale of such missiles by North Korea. Neither North Korea nor Yemen has signed any international treaties or bilateral agreements to prohibit such trade. In fact, no international treaty banning missiles sales exists and many countries, including the United States, sell both short and long range ballistic missiles. Lastly, it is not clear that selling ballistic missiles to Yemen is a threat to US security or that of states in the region.
General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was the guest of honor in a roundtable discussion on U.S.-China security issues, jointly hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution.
If the U.S. succeeds in getting Ukraine to face up to the proliferation threat that its nuclear capabilities still pose, then we might be on the road to restoring the U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral relationship. And if Russia proves to be a good partner in this effort, then it might open up important possibilities for the future. In particular, if this works, then maybe it will work on North Korea.
This week, on the same day that Vice President Cheney belittled the UN inspections and warned Iraq that "this time, deception will not be tolerated," Secretary of State Powell said the inspection process was "off to a pretty good start." These contradictory appraisals reflect a deeper division within the administration on war with Iraq. President Bush's comment that "the signs are not encouraging" seems to embrace the hard-line views of Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. But, as in the past, his actions may not follow his tough rhetoric.
The following excerpts are from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's keynote address at the 2002 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 14.
Major problems are delaying the otherwise successful collaboration between the U.S. and Russia to prevent the theft of poorly-secured weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and related materials, technologies and expertise in the former Soviet Union. Government failure to correct these problems threatens to leave vast stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and biological agents vulnerable.
The United Nations Security Council has ordered inspectors back into Iraq with a sweeping new mandate to search everything everywhere. The question is: can they do the job? With the Security Council united and the credible threat of war should Iraq obstruct inspections there is a good chance that they can-- but only if the UN now gives the inspectors the resources they will need to disarm Saddam Hussein.
North Korea's recent disclosure of an active nuclear weapons program has led members of the Bush Administration and many observers in Washington to suggest that the North's program constitutes a violation of four international agreements. The implications of these violations depend on the details of the North Korean program, many of which remain unknown. In particular, the question of how advanced North Korea's efforts have progressed must be answered in order to determine whether North Korea is actually in violation of the letter of the following four agreements.
North Korea’s admission that it has an active nuclear weapons program in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States and the 1991 North-South Korean Denuclearization Agreement is a stunning development. North Korea’s open pursuit of nuclear weapons has the potential to quickly and permanently destabilize the security situation in East Asia and beyond. While it is still not clear if North Korea is currently producing weapons-grade materials, its renewed and now open admission that it is seeking nuclear weapons requires the United States, its allies and the entire world to quickly develop ways to confront North Korea’s program and prevent it from continuing.
In recent weeks, several assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs have been released to the public. The following analysis compares the report from the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the dossier released by the government of the United Kingdom, the report from the Institute for Interational Strategic Studies and the Iraq chapter from the Carnegie study Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction.
America's security remains under constant threat today from the Al Qaeda terrorist network and other Islamic extremists. Recent statements by the Director of Central Intelligence affirm that hundreds or thousands of Al Qaeda members are dispersed throughout the world, have re-established communications and support networks, and are actively planning new attacks against the United States. This is an enemy that operates from dozens of countries, from Hamburg to Manila, Khartoum to Karachi, and Buffalo to Portland. The single most important strategic criteria for military action against Iraq is whether or not such a course will aid or hinder U.S. efforts to prevent terrorist attacks.
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