Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Proliferation Analysis
    Ten Questions on North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Program- Updated 1/7
    January 7, 2003

    On October 16, 2002, the Bush Administration announced that, in meetings earlier this month, North Korea admitted that it has a uranium enrichment program. With this announcement came very few details about this newly-disclosed program. Statements from the administration, alongside reports from the media, have allowed us to piece together some of the missing details. Still, significant information about this program remains unknown. The implications of North Korea's disclosure depend on the details of the program, ranging from its origins and level of development to the regime's willingness to close it down.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    U.S. Nonproliferation Policy
    Jon Wolfsthal January 6, 2003 Washington, D.C.

    Moves by North Korea to restart its nuclear reactor program and by Iran to build advanced nuclear facilities to produce weapons-grade materials, threaten to blow the lid off long-standing nonproliferation efforts. The developments show that the approach being pursued by the current administration for preventing the spread of nuclear arms has failed and needs immediate adjustment.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Change the Policy in Iraq
    Michael McFaul January 1, 2003 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Bush's Folly
    December 18, 2002

    For the first time in U.S. history, a president will deploy a major weapon system without knowing whether it will work or not. Exempting the missile defense program from required weapons procurement rules, President Bush will rush to deploy interceptor rockets in Alaska without any operational tests and after failing almost half of their preliminary development tests, including the last one. With every missile defense program behind schedule and over budget, all available evidence indicates that the Alaska system cannot work. Whether one is for or against this program, everyone should be troubled by the way the president is proceeding.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Why We Won't Go to War
    December 13, 2002

    The U.S. administration has convinced most journalists and world leaders that it will soon attack Iraq. The rhetoric is escalating and so are military movements. There are now 60,000 U.S. troops on the border of Iraq and 45,000 more could fly in with short notice to marry up with pre-positioned equipment. Leaked plans detail a ferocious, short war to isolate, then topple Saddam Hussein. Arab leaders publicly oppose a war, but news reports indicate their quiet support. President George Bush seems ready to let loose the dogs of war at any moment. Which is precisely why he will not have to.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Time to Deal With North Korea
    December 12, 2002

    North Korea’s decision to restart its plutonium production reactors creates an immediate crisis for the United States and its allies in the region. This event threatens to recreate the tense standoff that nearly led to war on the Korean peninsula in 1994. This dangerous decision by North Korea seems a transparent move designed to bring the United States back to the negotiating table and resume a direct dialogue with Washington. Although the Bush administration is unlikely to see this move as an opportunity to engage the North Koreans, the United States should move quickly to negotiate with Pyongyang to secure a total ban on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Stopping Missiles At Their Source
    December 11, 2002

    The seizure and subsequent release of North Korean scud missiles bound for Yemen on the high seas is a dramatic development, but the export of missiles from North Korea to Yemen should come as no surprise. North Korea has sold Yemen Scud missiles before, and the U.S. imposed sanctions against North Korea for such commerce just this past August. Despite U.S. concerns, however, there is nothing illegal about the sale of such missiles by North Korea. Neither North Korea nor Yemen has signed any international treaties or bilateral agreements to prohibit such trade. In fact, no international treaty banning missiles sales exists and many countries, including the United States, sell both short and long range ballistic missiles. Lastly, it is not clear that selling ballistic missiles to Yemen is a threat to US security or that of states in the region.

     
  • Event
    Sino-U.S. and International Security Issues: A Roundtable Discussion with General Xiong Guangkai
    Minxin Pei, Savina Rupani, Michael D. Swaine December 10, 2002 New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000

    General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was the guest of honor in a roundtable discussion on U.S.-China security issues, jointly hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Why We Won't Go to War
    Joseph Cirincione December 9, 2002 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Op-Ed
    Partners in Preventing Nuclear Proliferation?
    Rose Gottemoeller December 9, 2002 Washington, D.C.

    If the U.S. succeeds in getting Ukraine to face up to the proliferation threat that its nuclear capabilities still pose, then we might be on the road to restoring the U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral relationship. And if Russia proves to be a good partner in this effort, then it might open up important possibilities for the future. In particular, if this works, then maybe it will work on North Korea.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The Administration Divide
    December 6, 2002

    This week, on the same day that Vice President Cheney belittled the UN inspections and warned Iraq that "this time, deception will not be tolerated," Secretary of State Powell said the inspection process was "off to a pretty good start." These contradictory appraisals reflect a deeper division within the administration on war with Iraq. President Bush's comment that "the signs are not encouraging" seems to embrace the hard-line views of Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. But, as in the past, his actions may not follow his tough rhetoric.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei on the Non-Proliferation Regime and Iraq
    December 4, 2002 Washington, D.C.

    The following excerpts are from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's keynote address at the 2002 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 14.

     
  • Report
    Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade
    November 13, 2002 Washington, D.C.

    Major problems are delaying the otherwise successful collaboration between the U.S. and Russia to prevent the theft of poorly-secured weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and related materials, technologies and expertise in the former Soviet Union. Government failure to correct these problems threatens to leave vast stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and biological agents vulnerable.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Give Inspectors the Tools They Need
    Joseph Cirincione November 13, 2002 Carnegie
     
  • Paper
    Fire in the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation
    Michael A. Levi November 12, 2002 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Now the Inspections Begin
    November 8, 2002

    The United Nations Security Council has ordered inspectors back into Iraq with a sweeping new mandate to search everything everywhere. The question is: can they do the job? With the Security Council united and the credible threat of war should Iraq obstruct inspections there is a good chance that they can-- but only if the UN now gives the inspectors the resources they will need to disarm Saddam Hussein.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    North Korea's Secret Nuclear Weapons Program: A Serious Violation of North Korea's International Commitments?
    October 25, 2002

    North Korea's recent disclosure of an active nuclear weapons program has led members of the Bush Administration and many observers in Washington to suggest that the North's program constitutes a violation of four international agreements. The implications of these violations depend on the details of the North Korean program, many of which remain unknown. In particular, the question of how advanced North Korea's efforts have progressed must be answered in order to determine whether North Korea is actually in violation of the letter of the following four agreements.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    North Korea's Nuclear Breach
    October 17, 2002

    North Korea’s admission that it has an active nuclear weapons program in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States and the 1991 North-South Korean Denuclearization Agreement is a stunning development. North Korea’s open pursuit of nuclear weapons has the potential to quickly and permanently destabilize the security situation in East Asia and beyond. While it is still not clear if North Korea is currently producing weapons-grade materials, its renewed and now open admission that it is seeking nuclear weapons requires the United States, its allies and the entire world to quickly develop ways to confront North Korea’s program and prevent it from continuing.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Iraq's WMD Programs: A Comparison of Assessments
    October 11, 2002

    In recent weeks, several assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs have been released to the public. The following analysis compares the report from the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the dossier released by the government of the United Kingdom, the report from the Institute for Interational Strategic Studies and the Iraq chapter from the Carnegie study Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Attacking Iraq Could Increase Terror Against America
    September 30, 2002

    America's security remains under constant threat today from the Al Qaeda terrorist network and other Islamic extremists. Recent statements by the Director of Central Intelligence affirm that hundreds or thousands of Al Qaeda members are dispersed throughout the world, have re-established communications and support networks, and are actively planning new attacks against the United States. This is an enemy that operates from dozens of countries, from Hamburg to Manila, Khartoum to Karachi, and Buffalo to Portland. The single most important strategic criteria for military action against Iraq is whether or not such a course will aid or hinder U.S. efforts to prevent terrorist attacks.

     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

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  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

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  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is the Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

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  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Visiting Scholar
    Carnegie Europe

    Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

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