Nuclear Policy

 
 

All

  • Proliferation Analysis
    Iraq's WMD Arsenal: Deadly But Limited
    Joseph Cirincione August 28, 2002 Washington, D.C.

    Many well-meaning political figures have made the mistake that Senator James Inhofe made on Meet the Press on August 18: "Our intelligence system has said that we know that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction -- I believe including nuclear.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Brief History of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Program - Part II
    August 27, 2002

    The Iraqis focused their efforts on developing an implosion-type weapon, whose basic design involves surrounding a subcritical mass, or core, of fissile material (in this case, highly enriched uranium) with conventional high-explosive charges. The charges are uniformly detonated to compress the nuclear material into a supercritical configuration. Iraq's weaponization program was in its early stages at the time of the Gulf War. In spite of making progress in the high-explosive testing program, Iraqi scientists were still struggling to master the high-explosive charges that must be precisely fabricated in order to produce homogeneous shock waves against the core after ignition.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Brief History of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Program - Part I
    August 22, 2002

    Iraq ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty on October 29, 1969, pledging not to manufacture nuclear weapons and agreeing to place all its nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards. Iraq violated its NPT obligations, however, by secretly pursuing a multi-billion-dollar nuclear weapon program. Iraq's near-term potential to develop nuclear weapons has been curtailed by the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, adopted in April 1991, following Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Russian Chemical Waiver
    August 6, 2002

    On August 1, the Senate agreed to an amendment proposed by Senator Richard Lugar that would allow the Bush administration to waive congressional requirements so that the Department of Defense could resume funding construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye, Russia. Congress requires that administrations annually certify that Russia has complied with its chemical weapon treaty responsibilities in order for CW elimination funds to be expended.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Hearings on Iraq
    July 31, 2002

    As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins two days of hearings on Iraq on July 31, it is useful to review what we know and what we don't know about Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Baghdad's pursuit of WMD and its refusal to permit UN weapon inspectors to carry out their Security Council mandate is a critical issue as Washington debates possible military action against Saddam Hussein. Weapons inspectors were able to destroy more facilities, missiles and weapons after the Gulf War than the allied military during the actual military operation.

     
  • Paper
    Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan
    Rose Gottemoeller, Rebecca Longsworth July 30, 2002 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Op-Ed
    Pervez, the Friendly Dictator
    George Perkovich July 29, 2002 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    China's Commitment to the Non-Proliferation Regime
    July 22, 2002

    Drawing China into the nuclear and missile non-proliferation regimes has been a long-term process. Since opening a dialogue with China in the early 1970s, the United States has used a range of positive incentives and disincentives to encourage China to sign on to the various unilateral and multi-lateral commitments that make up the international non-proliferation regime. During the 1980s and 1990s, China's nuclear-related exports, particularly to Pakistan, were of major international proliferation concern. China, however, made notable strides in the 1990s by joining formal arms control and non-proliferation regimes.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Russian Assistance to Iran
    July 17, 2002

    The Bush administration had three security priorities with regards to Russia when it assumed office: withdraw from the ABM Treaty, pursue its vision of nuclear arms reduction, and stop Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Having achieved the first two, the Administration is poised to turn its attention to the issue of Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile programs. Secretary of State Powell noted as much during his July 9 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stating that the issue of Iran would be at the top of the agenda when Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld met with their Russian counterparts in September as part of the newly established four party group.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Treaty Politics
    Jon Wolfsthal July 10, 2002

    President Bush and his administration opposed negotiating a binding arms control agreement to limit nuclear force. President Putin wanted a legally binding document. Each side got what they wanted with the Treaty of Moscow; a legally binding document that fails to control or reduce anything.

     
  • Op-Ed
    The Moscow Treaty Will Not Eliminate Weapons or Reduce Arsenals
    Joseph Cirincione July 1, 2002 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    It Takes More Than Money
    June 28, 2002

    President Bush and the other G-7 countries have agreed to spend up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to fund a new "global partnership for the destruction of weapons of mass destruction." The funds will help Russia better control and eliminate its vast stocks of nuclear materials, as well as chemical weapons and biological weapon agents. The pledge is a major step forward, especially for Europe, Japan and Canada, whose support for threat reduction efforts in Russia have not come any where near to matching the $5 billion contribution made by the U.S. since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    No ABM Treaty, No Missile Defense
    June 17, 2002

    Many national security experts, including this one, warned that if the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty there would be an international storm of protest. On June 13, President Bush withdrew from the treaty, and the world went on without a hiccup. There is concern but no outrage. The United States and Russia have just negotiated a new treaty continuing reductions in long-range nuclear weapons but without any limits on future missile defense systems. Relations with Russia have never been better. Is this a complete vindication of the president's policies, as White House officials claim?

     
  • Op-Ed
    From Summits to Sleepovers
    Rose Gottemoeller June 17, 2002 Washington, D.C.

    If Putin and Bush are able to drive forward on the agenda that they have set for themselves, then we will truly enter a new period of U.S.-Russian partnership. If they do not, then the relationship will drift, and we'll be left with the worst of all worlds -- informality without progress, casual friendship without results.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Exploding Threats - Out of Proportion
    June 12, 2002

    The arrest and detention of alleged dirty bomber Abdullah Al Mujahir sent waves of shock throughout the country. The threat posed by the possible use of a radiological dispersal device remains serious, and a threat for which the United States government and its people are not adequately prepared. In the days since Attorney General Ashcroft's dramatic announcement, however, it is less clear how direct the link is between Al Mujahir and the possible use of a radioactive device. If the Justice Department has exaggerated the nature of the link between the suspect and a dirty bomb, then it needs to re-calibrate its tone and approach.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Panic Is a Worse Enemy Than 'Dirty' Bombs
    Rose Gottemoeller June 12, 2002 Washington, D.C.
     
  • Event
    Carnegie Book Release- Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Joseph Cirincione, Miriam Rajkumar, Jon Wolfsthal June 12, 2002 Washington, D.C.

    Introduction by Carnegie President Jessica T. Mathews.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    India and Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities
    June 7, 2002

    There is great uncertainty over the number, location and operational status of the nuclear weapons held by India and Pakistan. The project has prepared a short overview of the two nations' nuclear capabilities drawn from extensive analysis from the latest Carnegie study, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction.

     
  • Event
    Experts Weigh U.S. Role as India-Pakistan Tensions Rise
    Lee Feinstein June 6, 2002 Carnegie

    Listen to audio from this event.

     
  • Paper
    A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11
    Lee Feinstein, James Clad, Lewis Dunn, David Albright May 31, 2002 Beirut, Lebanon
     
Back to main page

Follow the Nuclear Policy Program

Nuclear Policy Conference 20175

Proliferation News

Enter your email address in the field below to receive the latest Proliferation News in your inbox!

Personal Information
 

Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

  •  
  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

  •  
  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

  •  
  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

  •  
  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

  •  
  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

  •  
  • Jamie Kwong
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is the Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Cyber Policy Initiative

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

  •  
  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Vipin Narang
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Vipin Narang is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

  •  
  • Sinan Ülgen
    Visiting Scholar
    Carnegie Europe

    Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

  •  
  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

  •  
  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

  •  
 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
 
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103 Phone: 202 483 7600 Fax: 202 483 1840
Please note...

You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers.

请注意...

你将离开清华—卡内基中心网站,进入卡内基其他全球中心的网站。