Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Follow Carnegie
-
Search
-
Global Resources
Global Centers
Languages
On December 15, Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards presented a comprehensive plan to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Edwards' policy establishes new standards and safeguards to stop the spread of unconventional weapons, gives the international community new tools to punish nations that violate these standards, and improves America's ability to become an international leader in this effort. Governor Howard Dean and Senator John Kerry also recently advanced strong, new proposals. Below, we summarize each of the three initiatives, and we will track all of the candidates' positions though the campaign.
Charles Krauthammer has been an influential columnist and longtime critic of arms control and multilateral non-proliferation treaties. In February 2004, the American Enterprise Institute will present Dr. Krauthammer, who "profoundly influenced both American foreign policy doctrine and debate," with the Irving Kristol Award for making "extraordinary intellectual or practical contributions to improved government policy, social welfare, or political understanding." Those who support and want to reinforce the non-proliferation regime have a responsibility to understand the criticisms of the regime. Below are excerpts from two of Krauthammer's articles that AEI cites as highlights of his writing:
The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has led to a close scrutiny of the role of intelligence agencies in both the United States and Britain. As Brigadier General (ret.) Shlomo Brom, points out, Israeli intelligence, which was in full agreement with American and British intelligence estimates, has, however, remained "in the shadows." General Brom, a senior research associate at Tel Aviv University's Jaffe Center, calls for an inquiry into the performance of Israeli intelligence agencies. In an article titled "The War in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure," first published in "Strategic Assessment," General Brom makes three key points: (1) Israeli intelligence agencies failed because they did not realize that Saddam Hussein's main goal was survival; (2) Israeli intelligence tends to adopt the worst-case scenario; (3) Inflated threat assessments exact a heavy price.
If Iran and North Korea acquire nuclear arsenals, their weapons will present obvious and direct dangers to the United States, its troops, its allies, and regional and global stability.
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's speech to the United Nations on November 5 was a clear and definitive public statement of the Bush Administration's support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Speaking in a joint appearance with Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, Abraham underscored the good working relationship that the two men have cultivated in office: "For two years, we have worked closely together to reduce proliferation threats by personally overseeing the implementation of critical bilateral cooperative nonproliferation programs."
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's speech to the United Nations on November 5 was a clear and definitive public statement of the Bush Administration's support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Speaking in a joint appearance with Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, Abraham underscored the good working relationship that the two men have cultivated in office: "For two years, we have worked closely together to reduce proliferation threats by personally overseeing the implementation of critical bilateral cooperative nonproliferation programs."
The “Agreement on Political Process” signed on November 15 by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and by Jalal Talabani for the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) provides a much needed and long overdue roadmap for the restoration of sovereignty to an Iraqi government. Unfortunately, the agreement contains numerous clauses that will make implementation quite difficult. A two-stage process is the only approach that can lead to Iraqi sovereignty reasonably soon. As designed, however, the process contains several contradictions and an impossible timetable.
In honor of the memory of President John F. Kennedy, we present some of his most important comments on the dangers inherent in the possession of nuclear arms and his proposals for stopping the spread of the the most deadly weapons ever invented. "There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964. This is extremely serious. . . I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war."
The following on Iran's WMD capabilities is taken from the CIA's biannual "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," from January1 - June 30, 2003. This report was released November 10, 2003.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has found that "there is no evidence that the previous undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons program." Not yet, anyway. Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's report adds that Iran's past "pattern of concealment" means "it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."
Charles E. Bennett was a war hero, a man of deep religious belief, a southern conservative Democrat, and a member of the House of Representatives for 44 years. He believed in a strong military, large defense budgets, a powerful Navy and integrity in government.
The following is an extended excerpt of a speech by former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski from the October 28-29 Conference, "New American Strategies for Security and Peace." Dr. Brzezinski concludes, "American power worldwide is at its historic zenith. American global political standing is at its nadir." He warns, "Since the tragedy of 9-11 which understandably shook and outraged everyone in this country, we have increasingly embraced at the highest official level what I think fairly can be called a paranoiac view of the world...The state of isolation in which the United States finds itself today is due in part because that skewed view of the world is intensified by a fear that periodically verges on panic that is in itself blind. By this I mean the absence of a clearly, sharply defined perception of what is transpiring abroad regarding particularly such critically important security issues as the existence or the spread or the availability...of weapons of mass destruction."
The NPT has been a huge success story for 35 years in stemming nuclear proliferation. In the 1990s, however, cracks began to emerge in that regime and they have grown and become serious enough to threaten the stability of the entire regime.
The Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union outlined its Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Later that week, the EU issued an Action Plan to implement the strategy.
Europe is celebrating the British, French and German foreign ministers' diplomatic coup in Tehran last week. The three foreign ministers succeeded in convincing Iran to agree to suspend uranium enrichment activities and to sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, authorizing more intrusive inspections. Most European commentators are hailing this breakthrough as an important achievement for Europe. The Austrian Der Standard called it "the greatest success for European diplomacy in ten years of political union, since the Maastricht Treaty."
On October 21, Iran announced that it would temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment program and sign the Additional Protocol, requiring more robust inspections. Iranian officials declined to specify the duration or form of this suspension. The tougher inspection system would authorize International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to perform spot checks of any suspicious sites, without prior notice. Dr. Rowhani, head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, stated that Iran would probably sign the protocol before the November 20th IAEA board meeting.
Enter your email address in the field below to receive the latest Proliferation News in your inbox!
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.
Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.
Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.
Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.
Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.
Lindsay Rand is a Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Sinan Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.
Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.
You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers.
你将离开清华—卡内基中心网站，进入卡内基其他全球中心的网站。