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One would think, with the end of the cold war, the global war against terrorism, and the high level of attention paid to proliferation, that NPT members would be poised to reaffirm the Treaty’s vital importance and take action to enhance it for the years ahead. Yet, it is now clear that the NPT is in crisis.
North Korea does not have a missile that can hit the United States. This is a theoretical capability, not an operational one. Nor is there any evidence, at least in open sources or leaked classified ones, that North Korea can make a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a long-range missile.
In an April 29th op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, Henry Sokolski and George Perkovich challenge Iran’s argument about its ‘inalienable’ right to enrich uranium under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Citing the overall intent of the NPT to curb the spread of dangerous nuclear technology, Sokolski and Perkovich argue that the right of states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy" is not absolute and Iran’s stance that a state can legally acquire all nuclear technology up to but not including a complete nuclear weapon is a misinterpretation of the treaty.
Testimony was given as part of the hearing entitled, "Previewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a good program that has been puffed up out of proportion. While the initiative is a valuable extension of export control implementation, it is not and cannot be a silver bullet to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons-related materials and equipment to terrorists or states.
A considerable number of Russian authorities continue to believe in a conspiracy theory in which American imperialism and the CIA play a central role. This conspiracy theory extends to the recent revolutionary events in the post-Soviet countries. However, unless something drastic happens, there will be no revolution in Russia, at least in the short-term perspective.
India's foreign minister visited Washington last week and met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to discuss a range of mutual interests, from countering China's strategic clout to promoting economic growth and resolving India-Pakistan tensions. Unfortunately, the Bush administration's obsession with Iran threatens to block a major initiative that could advance those goals.
Strengthening the NPT cannot be done by the US alone, but it certainly cannot be done without Washington’s active and constructive support. The U.S. must show that it can and will effectively use the diplomatic tools at its disposal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
23 top non-proliferation experts and former government officials have endorsed an agenda to strengthen the NPT. The group agrees that the NPT's future success depends on "universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more effective regional security strategies, and renewed progress toward fulfillment of... disarmament obligations."
Two former U.S. secretaries of defense, a former U.S. secretary of state, and twenty other nonproliferation experts released a statement today urging all governments to recommit themselves to their obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a bulwark against proliferation.
The president’s commission on intelligence delivered half a report. Like the colonel played by Jack Nicholson in "A Few Good Men," the commission acted as if America can’t handle the truth. The commissioners would have us believe that those who provided the false intelligence were solely to blame, and the senior political leaders who ordered and presented the claims to the public were passive victims. Conservative pundits have quickly declared, "case closed," and urge us to focus on rearranging the deck chairs on the intelligence ship. But buried deep inside the report is evidence that contradicts the commission’s own conclusions and raises serious questions about their recommendations. Most damning is the tale of two CIA analysts who were removed from their positions for "causing waves" when they questioned the reliability of the defector known as "Curveball." (Read More)
While we focus on the important problems of preventing new states or terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons, we must also take decisive action to lock in these past successes.
As painful experience in Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran has shown, the rules that govern nuclear exports, safeguard nuclear materials, and control and eliminate nuclear weapons are not self-enforcing. States and international agencies must struggle to mobilize the power needed to enforce and adapt these rules as conditions change.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan calls in a new report for states to renew efforts to improve verification and enforcement measures in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In just over one month, representative from over 180 countries will meet in New York to review the status and condition of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This meeting, which takes place every five years as required by the agreement, occurs in an environment more negative than at anytime in its history and the potential for the month-long meeting to produce a positive result is in serious doubt. South Korea is in a unique position to improve the prospects for a successful meeting and Seoul should take active and even aggressive steps to play a large, constructive role at the meeting. (Read More)
In just over one month, representative from over 180 countries will meet in New York to review the status and condition of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This meeting, which takes place every five years as required by the agreement, occurs in an environment more negative than at anytime in its history and the potential for the month-long meeting to produce a positive result is in serious doubt. South Korea is in a unique position to improve the prospects for a successful meeting and Seoul should take active and even aggressive steps to play a large, constructive role at the meeting.
Panel discussion on the challenges posed by Iran's nuclear program featuring Carnegie's George Perkovich.
In this paper presented at a high-level seminar on weapons of mass destruction in Brussels, Belgium, Pierre Goldschmidt discusses ways to increase IAEA verification authority in cases of non-compliance and how the international community should respond when a state decides to withdraw from the NPT.
In order to be successful, threat reduction programs must take into account the opinions of decisionmakers in recipient countries, as well as the lessons learned from threat reduction programs already in place.
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Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.
Toby Dalton is a senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.
Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Nicole Grajewski is a Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research examines Russian and Iranian policies in the global nuclear order, with a particular focus on Russian nuclear strategy, Iran’s nuclear decision-making, contestation in the non-proliferation regime, and nuclear deterrence.
Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.
Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.
Lindsay Rand is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Carnegie in 2022-2023.
Todd S. Sechser is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program and the Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds Jr. Discovery professor of politics and public policy at the University of Virginia.
Anne Stickells is a Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Dr. Lauren Sukin is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program and an assistant professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.
Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Tong Zhao is a senior fellow with the Nuclear Policy Program and Carnegie China.
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