Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Proliferation Analysis
    Tenet: On the Record
    March 10, 2004

    The testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9 adds valuable insight into four key intelligence controversies: the role of DOD Undersecretary Douglas Feith's special intelligence unit, and allegations of an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection, mobile bio-weapon labs, and Iraqi efforts to procure uranium. In order to avoid future intelligence failures on the scale of September 11 and the war in Iraq, the independent commission to investigate Iraqi intelligence - or another of the several intelligence inquiries that currently exist - must make a deeper probe into these misrepresentations and mistakes. We present excerpts and analysis of Tenet's testimony below.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Proliferation: Priorities, Not Intelligence, Problem
    Jon Wolfsthal March 4, 2004 Washington, D.C.

    The pace of developments in nuclear proliferation over the past 18 months is unprecedented, and it is hard for even dedicated experts to keep track and make sense of all the latest developments. Yet with all the developments, from Libya to Pakistan to North Korea, several questions have emerged to form the core debate over the future direction of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Great Distance but Great Impact: Pakistani and Libyan Development Affect North Korea Nuclear Issue
    Jon Wolfsthal February 26, 2004 Carnegie

    Recent events in Pakistan and Libya are directly affecting the Bush Administration's approach to North Korea's nuclear program. The disclosure of A.Q. Khan's elaborate efforts to uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons technology and the decision by Col. Khadaffi to abandon his WMD programs have reinforced the Bush administration's perception that their tough approach is paying dividends.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The French Were Right
    February 24, 2004

    In a February 23 speech, President Bush asserted what has become a common defense of his decision to go to war with Iraq. All nations saw the danger, he said, but only he had the courage to act. It is true that many nations believed that Iraq likely retained some undeclared chemical or biological weapons. But few thought the danger so grave and immediate as to require war over containment and intrusive inspections. In the UN Security Council, France was the most outspoken opponent of the rush to war. For their opposition, the French were ridiculed and reviled by many Americans, with the Congressional leadership going so far as to remove "French" from the fries and toast on Capitol Hill menus. One year later, rereading the French position, even the most ardent Franco-hater should admit they owe France an apology.

     
  • Op-Ed
    The World Just Got Safer. Give Diplomacy the Credit
    Joseph Cirincione February 21, 2004 Beirut

    In the past few weeks we have witnessed remarkable changes in some of the most difficult and dangerous global nuclear proliferation threats. Rather than heading toward military conflicts, the United States seems to be moving toward negotiated solutions that could end the nascent nuclear weapons programs in Iran, Libya and possibly also North Korea.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Bush's New Plan to Stop Proliferation
    Joseph Cirincione February 20, 2004 Carnegie

    Like an investor watching his returns plummet, President Bush is rebalancing his proliferation portfolio. The huge cost of the Iraq war and his sinking poll ratings seem to have convinced the president that he has invested too heavily in military operations and unilateral initiatives and that it is time to move some political capital to international organizations and cooperative ventures.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Peace Process in South Asia
    February 19, 2004

    On Wednesday, February 18, senior foreign ministry officials from India and Pakistan concluded their first round of renewed talks amidst a remarkable spirit of bonhomie: India's Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan's President Musharraf are getting along, transportation links have been re-established, cross-border terrorism in Kashmir has diminished significantly, and, arguably most important to the people, the Indian cricket team will soon play in Pakistan after a thirteen-year hiatus. The process is genuinely amicable. Genuine peace will be the hard part.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Inspectors Had the Real WMD Clues
    Jessica Tuchman Mathews February 12, 2004 Carnegie

    So far, efforts to unravel why both British and American intelligence were so wrong about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have ignored one crucial fact: while governments on both sides of the Atlantic were getting the picture wrong, United Nations inspectors were getting it largely right.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The President's Proliferation Initiative
    February 11, 2004

    President Bush’s February 11, 2004 speech on non-proliferation was a step in the right direction in pursuing a stronger, more effective and more international nonproliferation policy. Many of the initiatives, if implemented, will increase the ability of the United States and the international community to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. It remains to be seen, however, if the President’s strong words will lead to greater funding for and greater international cooperation by the United States on critical non-proliferation efforts.

     
  • Event
    Examination of Global Proliferation Strategy

    12:15 – 2:00 p.m. David Kay, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Robert Litwak to speak at Carnegie

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Powell Proved Deception, But Not Imminent Threat
    February 3, 2004

    On the one year anniversary of secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council, we are re-posting Project Director Joseph Cirincione's analysis of the secretary's remarks at that time.

    (Originally posted February 5, 2003) Secretary of State Colin Powell calmly detailed before the United Nations Security Council US evidence of Iraq's failure to comply fully with UN disarmament orders. While the secretary focused on Iraqi deception, most nations remained fixed on the threat. They did not hear any new evidence that the danger from Iraq was urgent or severe enough to justify the extreme step of authorizing an invasion and occupation of an Arab state.Within the Arab world, the editorial opinion of the Jordan Times was typical: the speech "did not amount to convincing evidence…that Iraq presents any real or imminent danger." The Times argues that the US charges "can only be answered by allowing the UN inspectors the time, resources and support neede to carry out their mandate."

     
  • Op-Ed
    Truth or Dare
    George Perkovich February 2, 2004 Washington, D.C.

    In early January, my Carnegie Endowment colleagues and I released a report detailing systemic flaws in U.S. intelligence and decision-making regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Intelligence on Iraq Part II: Rising Alarm
    January 31, 2004

    Beginning in mid-2002, however, the official statements of the threat shifted dramatically towards greater alarm regarding certainty of the threat and greater certainty as to the evidence. This shift does not appear to have been supported by new, concrete evidence from intelligence community reports-at least those now publicly available. These statements were picked up and amplified by congressional leaders, major media and some experts.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Intelligence on Iraq Part I: Foundations of the Assessments
    January 30, 2004

    Prior to 2002, many national and international officials and experts believed that Iraq likely had research programs and some stores of hidden chemical or biological weapons and maintained interest in a program to develop nuclear weapons. The debate that began in 2002 was not over weapons, but over war. The issue was whether Iraq's capabilities and its failure to cooperate fully with UN inspections by adequately accounting for its activities posed such a severe threat as to require military invasion and occupation in early 2003.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Crying Wolf on Iraqi WMD Costs US Credibility on North Korea
    Jon Wolfsthal January 28, 2004 Beirut
     
  • Op-Ed
    Keeping a Nuke Peddler in Line
    Jon Wolfsthal January 11, 2004 واشنطن

    It's been a poorly kept secret for several years that Pakistan helped develop nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and probably in Libya. For the United States, however, Pakistan's help in the war on terror has been more important than its peddling of nuclear technology to rogue states.

     
  • Report
    WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications
    Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton January 8, 2004 Washington, D.C.

    A groundbreaking report details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.

     
  • Event
    WMD in IRAQ: Evidence and Implications

    Authors present findings of new report, click for audio from the event.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    WMD in Iraq
    January 7, 2004

    Drawing useful lessons from experience begins with an accurate record of what happened. It is not too soon to begin this inquiry into the Iraq experience, because public confusion is widespread and revisionism has already begun. Some pundits now claim that the war was never about WMD but was undertaken to bring democracy to Iraq or the entire Middle East. Others say it was a response to 9/11 or was the necessary answer to a composite threat posed by Saddam Hussein's domestic evils, past aggressions, defiance of the United Nations, and desire for WMD. The administration has adjusted its public expectation of what Iraq will be found to have had from actual weapons and massive stockpiles of agent, to weapons programs, to "capabilities," and even to the "capability that Iraq sought" for weapons of mass destruction. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has called WMD merely "the one reason everyone could agree on," chosen for "bureaucratic reasons."

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Dealing with North Korea
    Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal December 18, 2003 Washington, D.C.

    Despite more than 10 years of direct and indirect negotiations, threats, confrontations, and analysis, the United States still does not know with any certainty the answer to the question: Will North Korea verifiably eliminate all of its nuclear capabilities if the terms are right?

     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

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  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

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  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

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  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Lindsay Rand
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Lindsay Rand is a Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie Europe

    Sinan Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

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