Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Book
    The Russian Military: Power and Policy
    Dmitri Trenin, Steven E. Miller September 9, 2004 American Academy Studies in Global Security

    This book assesses today's Russian military and analyzes its possible future direction.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Does Moscow Know Something That Washington Doesn't?
    Jon Wolfsthal September 2, 2004

    The Russian Atomic Energy Agency announced on September 1 that additional troops had been dispatched to guard nuclear facilities throughout Russia.The troop move is a sign that Russia recognizes that the threat to its nuclear facilities. US programs to assist Russian nuclear security also need to recognize that the threat has changed and move to accelerate and expand ongoing efforts.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The IAEA’s Report on Iran: No Slam Dunk
    September 2, 2004

    Last year, after European Union ministers won a freeze in Iran’s nuclear uranium enrichment activities, U.S. officials had an opportunity to exploit this breakthrough and negotiate an end to a potentially hostile program. The right combination of force and diplomacy might have worked to allow Tehran to build nuclear reactors, but not the nuclear fuel-fabrication processes that keep Iran’s nuclear bomb-making capabilities alive. Administration hardliners prevailed, however, and the United States pursued a more confrontational approach. They apparently believed that they had solid evidence of Iranian violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that would allow them to bring Iran before the UN Security Council, or provide justification for military strikes against the regime. But, it was no slam dunk.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Edwards Highlights Proliferation Policies
    Miriam Rajkumar August 31, 2004

    Vice presidential nominee John Edwards affirmed that the highest national security priority of a Kerry-Edwards administration will be to prevent nuclear terrorism.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Niger Uranium: Still a False Claim
    Joseph Cirincione August 28, 2004

    A little common sense shows that a Niger uranium sale--even if attempted--was always highly improbable and was never a serious threat.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Plutonium Primer
    Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal August 26, 2004

    Although detailed information about reprocessing was declassified by the United States and France in the 1950s and is generally available, it is still a complex procedure from an engineering point of view. Almost every nation that has tried to develop nuclear-weapons via the plutonium route—India, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan—has sought outside help from the advanced nuclear-supplier countries.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Brief History of the Brazilian Nuclear Program
    Joseph Cirincione August 18, 2004

    Any long-term solution to ending the Iranian nuclear program will have to include limits to other national programs to enrich uranium, including that in Brazil. No nation will willing agree to a policy it sees as discriminatory; there will have to be one standard acceptable to all nations.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The Importance of Inspections
    July 26, 2004 Carnegie

    The following is adapted from the remarks of Dr. Hans Blix, chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21 and 22, 2004.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Commission Pulls Its Punches But Delivers Useful Proliferation Recommendations
    Alexis Orton, Joseph Cirincione July 22, 2004

    The 9/11 commission concluded that any strategy to combat terrorism must be combined with a comprehensive effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Intelligence Patterns - and Problems
    July 19, 2004

    Following the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee report on pre-war assessments of Iraqi WMD, Carnegie has updated the four summary tables that appear in WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications on each type of suspected weapons: nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile and delivery programs. The summary tables show several key patterns.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Job Half Done
    Joseph Cirincione, Orton Alexis July 14, 2004 Carnegie

    The new reports from the Senate Intelligence Committee and the United Kingdom's parliamentary inquiry by Lord Butler offer devastating critiques of both nations' intelligence failures in Iraq.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The President's Proliferation Pitch
    Jon Wolfsthal, Joseph Cirincione July 13, 2004

    President Bush fails to appreciate how all of the diplomatic, economic and political tools can be used to pursue an even more effective set of proliferation policies. The U.S. needs to use all of the tools at its disposal, now more than ever.

     
  • Op-Ed
    How Sincere Is the US Offer to Negotiate with Pyongyang?
    Jon Wolfsthal July 13, 2004 Carnegie
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs
    July 12, 2004 Carnegie

    The following are excerpts from remarks by Linton F. Brooks, administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Edwards' Proliferation Policy
    Joesph Cirincione July 7, 2004

    Senator John Edwards detailed a strategy to combat proliferation that called for a new "Global Compact" to heighten security for existing nuclear facilities and material, toughen international inspections, limit production of nuclear bomb materials and nuclear fuel, and authorize strong, immediate punishment for any nation that violates and then quits the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Intelligence Failures
    July 7, 2004

    As background for the Senate Intelligence Committee's new report, we present below excerpts from the January 2004 Carnegie report, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. The report compared the intelligence assessments on Iraq with the UN inspectors' findings and what is now known. Why were the intelligence assessments so flawed? Were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition? The shift between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers' views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense.

    More resources on Iraq and intelligence:

    "A Tale of Two Intelligence Estimates," by Jessica Mathews and Jeff Miller, 26 March 2004

    "Revisiting the Case for War," Foreign Policy Web Exclusive by Joseph Cirincione, Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Alexis Orton, Updated March 2004

    "The Congress Shares Responsibility for War," by Joseph Cirincione and Michael O'Hanlon, Los Angeles Times Op-Ed, 19 November 2003

    "The Intelligence Bell Curve," by Joseph Cirincione, 17 July 2003

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Safer Form of Deterrence and Security
    July 2, 2004 Carnegie

    The following are excerpts from remarks by Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Now is the Time for a Determined, Comprehensive Effort in North Korea
    June 23, 2004

    North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program and may now possess several nuclear weapons. U.S. troops, allies in the region, and strategic interests are directly threatened by North Korea's growing nuclear capability, which has been pursued in violation of Pyongyang's commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other agreements. Given North Korea's economic strains, it is conceivable that for a high price Pyongyang might sell nuclear materials or weapons to other states or even terrorist groups, taking a regional threat to a global level. Such a scenario is so grave that U.S. policy makers could soon face a truly appalling choice between acquiescing in North Korea's transfer of its weapons technology and fighting a full-fledged war on the Korean peninsula.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    No Terror Ties
    June 17, 2004

    Untitled Document In January 2004, the authors of the Carnegie Endowment report, WMD in Iraq, found there was little evidence of operational ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda but there was significant evidence indicating the opposite. This finding contributed to the authors’ conclusion that administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq. Senior officials and some independent experts and journalist repeatedly asserted direct connections, even claiming Saddam Hussein was responsible for the attacks of September 11. In light of the new finding from the 9/11 Commission that there is no evidence of a "cooperative relationship" between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, we reprint the relevant section of the Carnegie report, below.

     
  • Op-Ed
    US Troop Reductions Risk War in Korea
    Jon Wolfsthal June 8, 2004 Carnegie
     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

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  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

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  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

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  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Lindsay Rand
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Lindsay Rand is a Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie Europe

    Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

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