Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Missile Obsession Distorted Threat Priorities

In the two months before September 11, five cabinet members, including National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, traveled to Moscow. They were not there to coordinate counter-terrorism operations or share threat assessments. They were fixated on one mission: convince the Russian leadership to scuttle the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

US Elections and Global Security

A Tale of Two Intelligence Estimates

The failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq is frequently portrayed as the result of either intelligence failures or misrepresentation of the intelligence by others. In fact, both were involved. It appears that a third factor was involved as well: misrepresentation of intelligence by the intelligence community itself. One week before lawmakers were to vote on the use of force in Iraq, the CIA released an unclassified version of its just-completed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). As the intelligence community's definitive judgments on key issues, NIEs are always important documents on which great care is expended. However, this NIE was unusually important because it was the authoritative assessment of the Iraqi threat available to members of Congress on which to base a decision whether to support or oppose a war.

The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges

The proliferation of unconventional weapons is the most serious national security threat the United States faces today. While chemical weapons can kill hundreds of people and biological weapons can potentially kill thousands, nuclear weapons are incomparably dangerous in scale of destruction and strategic impact.

The Key Proliferation Questions

The historic events in Libya, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea have raised several key questions that help frame the proliferation debate over the future direction of U.S. non-proliferation policy.

One Year Later: It Wasn't Us

The Bush administration, in the face of increasing criticism that it misled the public and Congress about the threat posed by Iraq's weapon programs and the ease of the occupation, last week began a broad defense of the decision to go to war in Iraq. Below we present key excerpts and commentary on the administration's major points. They are: 1) the war was a continuation of Clinton policy; 2) everyone thought Saddam had illicit weapons; 3) officials just repeated what the intelligence agencies told them; 4) they never said the threat was imminent; and 5) they never asserted an operational link between Al Qaeda and Iraq.

WMD and the United Nations

This is an extraordinarily important moment for the United Nations. Before attention is lost in the controversies over the war itself and in the challenges of its aftermath, the United Nations must capture, clarify and publicize the record of international inspections in Iraq: for itself, for member governments and for the public.

Tenet: On the Record

The testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9 adds valuable insight into four key intelligence controversies: the role of DOD Undersecretary Douglas Feith's special intelligence unit, and allegations of an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection, mobile bio-weapon labs, and Iraqi efforts to procure uranium. In order to avoid future intelligence failures on the scale of September 11 and the war in Iraq, the independent commission to investigate Iraqi intelligence - or another of the several intelligence inquiries that currently exist - must make a deeper probe into these misrepresentations and mistakes. We present excerpts and analysis of Tenet's testimony below.

Proliferation: Priorities, Not Intelligence, Problem

The pace of developments in nuclear proliferation over the past 18 months is unprecedented, and it is hard for even dedicated experts to keep track and make sense of all the latest developments. Yet with all the developments, from Libya to Pakistan to North Korea, several questions have emerged to form the core debate over the future direction of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Great Distance but Great Impact: Pakistani and Libyan Development Affect North Korea Nuclear Issue

Recent events in Pakistan and Libya are directly affecting the Bush Administration's approach to North Korea's nuclear program. The disclosure of A.Q. Khan's elaborate efforts to uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons technology and the decision by Col. Khadaffi to abandon his WMD programs have reinforced the Bush administration's perception that their tough approach is paying dividends.

The French Were Right

In a February 23 speech, President Bush asserted what has become a common defense of his decision to go to war with Iraq. All nations saw the danger, he said, but only he had the courage to act. It is true that many nations believed that Iraq likely retained some undeclared chemical or biological weapons. But few thought the danger so grave and immediate as to require war over containment and intrusive inspections. In the UN Security Council, France was the most outspoken opponent of the rush to war. For their opposition, the French were ridiculed and reviled by many Americans, with the Congressional leadership going so far as to remove "French" from the fries and toast on Capitol Hill menus. One year later, rereading the French position, even the most ardent Franco-hater should admit they owe France an apology.

The World Just Got Safer. Give Diplomacy the Credit

In the past few weeks we have witnessed remarkable changes in some of the most difficult and dangerous global nuclear proliferation threats. Rather than heading toward military conflicts, the United States seems to be moving toward negotiated solutions that could end the nascent nuclear weapons programs in Iran, Libya and possibly also North Korea.

Bush's New Plan to Stop Proliferation

Like an investor watching his returns plummet, President Bush is rebalancing his proliferation portfolio. The huge cost of the Iraq war and his sinking poll ratings seem to have convinced the president that he has invested too heavily in military operations and unilateral initiatives and that it is time to move some political capital to international organizations and cooperative ventures.

Peace Process in South Asia

On Wednesday, February 18, senior foreign ministry officials from India and Pakistan concluded their first round of renewed talks amidst a remarkable spirit of bonhomie: India's Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan's President Musharraf are getting along, transportation links have been re-established, cross-border terrorism in Kashmir has diminished significantly, and, arguably most important to the people, the Indian cricket team will soon play in Pakistan after a thirteen-year hiatus. The process is genuinely amicable. Genuine peace will be the hard part.

Inspectors Had the Real WMD Clues

So far, efforts to unravel why both British and American intelligence were so wrong about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have ignored one crucial fact: while governments on both sides of the Atlantic were getting the picture wrong, United Nations inspectors were getting it largely right.

The President's Proliferation Initiative

President Bush’s February 11, 2004 speech on non-proliferation was a step in the right direction in pursuing a stronger, more effective and more international nonproliferation policy. Many of the initiatives, if implemented, will increase the ability of the United States and the international community to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. It remains to be seen, however, if the President’s strong words will lead to greater funding for and greater international cooperation by the United States on critical non-proliferation efforts.

Examination of Global Proliferation Strategy

12:15 – 2:00 p.m. David Kay, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Robert Litwak to speak at Carnegie

Powell Proved Deception, But Not Imminent Threat

On the one year anniversary of secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council, we are re-posting Project Director Joseph Cirincione's analysis of the secretary's remarks at that time.

(Originally posted February 5, 2003) Secretary of State Colin Powell calmly detailed before the United Nations Security Council US evidence of Iraq's failure to comply fully with UN disarmament orders. While the secretary focused on Iraqi deception, most nations remained fixed on the threat. They did not hear any new evidence that the danger from Iraq was urgent or severe enough to justify the extreme step of authorizing an invasion and occupation of an Arab state.Within the Arab world, the editorial opinion of the Jordan Times was typical: the speech "did not amount to convincing evidence…that Iraq presents any real or imminent danger." The Times argues that the US charges "can only be answered by allowing the UN inspectors the time, resources and support neede to carry out their mandate."

Truth or Dare

In early January, my Carnegie Endowment colleagues and I released a report detailing systemic flaws in U.S. intelligence and decision-making regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.

Intelligence on Iraq Part II: Rising Alarm

Beginning in mid-2002, however, the official statements of the threat shifted dramatically towards greater alarm regarding certainty of the threat and greater certainty as to the evidence. This shift does not appear to have been supported by new, concrete evidence from intelligence community reports-at least those now publicly available. These statements were picked up and amplified by congressional leaders, major media and some experts.