Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Proliferation Analysis
    Nuclear Levees
    Joseph Cirincione September 6, 2005

    Officials have groped for references to atomic bombs to describe the destruction that Hurricane Katrina brought to the southeast United States. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour said, “I can only imagine that this is what Hiroshima looked like 60 years ago.”  But Hiroshima was much worse.  The bombing killed 140,000 people either immediately or within the year and destroyed or damaged 70,000 of the 76,000 buildings in the city.  Experts have warned for years of the real danger of a Hiroshima-size terrorist attack on an American city but, like the known risk to New Orleans, the government response has been woefully inadequate.  Now is the time to shore up the nuclear security dams and levees that can prevent this ultimate disaster.   (Read More)

     
  • Op-Ed
    The Process in Place
    Rose Gottemoeller August 23, 2005 New York Times
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Questioning the A-Bomb
    Jane Vaynman August 9, 2005

    Decades later, the debate rages on. Should the atomic bomb have been dropped on innocent civilians? Did the devastation of Hiroshima and, sixty years ago today, of Nagasaki save American lives? Robert L. Gallucci, Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, says no, he would not have used the bomb on cities. "Our targets should be military forces and leadership… President Truman should have looked for targets that were primarily military or genuine war industry… It is unlikely that Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be so described." On the other hand, Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, sees the decision to drop the bomb as necessary for the sake of saving lives. "The use of atomic weapons did not bring a world without war, but it did bring an end to the most lethal conflict in human history … I hope I would have made the same decision to shorten the agony that was WWII in the Pacific."

    In a fascinating article, the July issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists asks eight experts and historians to weigh in on the question: "Would you have dropped the bomb?" We provide highlights of two essays on each side – supporting the decision and arguing against it. (Read More)

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Einstein's Nuclear Warning
    Caterina Dutto August 3, 2005

    Sixty-six years ago this month, Albert Einstein sent an urgent letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.   “It may become possible,” he warned, “to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future.”  The military consequences were obvious.  “This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable -- though much less certain -- that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”  Worse, the Nazis might already be hard at work on just such a project,  “I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines, which she has taken over.” (Read More)

     
  • Op-Ed
    From Hiroshima to Armageddon: A Reading List
    George Perkovich July 31, 2005 Washington Post
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Fourth Time's the Charm?
    July 26, 2005

    North Korea’s unchecked nuclear weapons capabilities represent a serious threat to regional security; to several key U.S. allies, including South Korea and Japan; and to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Nuclear Triumph for India
    Miriam Rajkumar July 19, 2005

    On Monday July 17, President George W. Bush reversed decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, stating that India "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states," adding that he will "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security." President Bush thus accorded India a much sought-after seat in the "responsible" nuclear club. 

    This is a sweeping reversal of U.S. and international nuclear policy. While Washington has passed New Delhi’s litmus test on U.S. good intentions, what does this shift mean for U.S. leadership of global nonproliferation? (Read More)

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    A Blinding Flash of Light
    Caterina Dutto July 14, 2005

    The staggering 19-kiloton magnitude of the Trinity explosion surpassed even the expectations of Los Alamos Director J. Robert Oppenheimer. Sixty years ago this week, Los Alamos scientists tested the first nuclear weapon at the Trinity Site near Alamogordo, New Mexico. The test, which General Leslie Groves described as "a blinding flash of light," was a milestone of the Manhattan Project, the first large-scale effort to build a nuclear bomb. The unqualified military and scientific achievement of the Trinity test led to the devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cementing the decisive U.S. victory over Japan in World War II. Trinity brought to fruition the complex, multi-pronged effort to organize fissile materials production, perfect bomb designs, assemble the fissile materials in weapons, and stage the first successful test of an implosion-type weapon. (Read More)

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Nuclear Numbers, Then and Now
    Jane Vaynman, Joshua Williams July 14, 2005

    Today’s nuclear threats come not only from these massive arsenals, but also from the newest and smallest contributors to "nuclear numbers." The emergence of new nuclear states could set off a "cascade of proliferation" and increase the likelihood of terrorists obtaining nuclear capability.

     
  • Event
    Proliferation Threat Assessment, 2005
    Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar July 12, 2005 Washington, D.C.

    A discussion on global proliferation dangers based on the new Carnegie study, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats.

     
  • Book
    Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second Edition, Revised and Expanded

    The revised and expanded edition ofDeadly Arsenals provides the most up-to-date and comprehensive assessment available on global proliferation dangers, with a critical assessment of international enforcement efforts.

     
  • Op-Ed
    A Promising Direction for G8 Leadership
    Rose Gottemoeller July 8, 2005 The Moscow Times 中文

    At the close of the Gleneagles Summit this week, Russia will take over leadership of the Group of Eight, the "super club" of countries that in theory are driving the world economy and political system.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The End of “WMD”
    Joseph Cirincione July 7, 2005

    Words matter. When Deadly Arsenals hits the streets on July 12 (just slightly ahead of the new Harry Potter book) it will no longer use the expression “weapons of mass destruction.” The phrase confuses officials, befuddles the public, and justifies policies that more precise language and more accurate assessments would not support.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    10 Plus 10 Doesn’t Add Up
    Jon Wolfsthal July 6, 2005

    This week, the heads of the world’s leading market economies – the Group of 8 -- convene in Scotland for their annual summit. Important issues including debt relief and global warming will dominate the agenda.

     
  • Event
    Nonproliferation Issues at the Gleneagles Summit
    Michèle Flournoy, Rose Gottemoeller, Laura Holgate July 6, 2005 Washington, D.C.

    A discussion of the nonproliferation issues that are to be discussed at the upcoming Gleneagles Summit.

     
  • Testimony
    Testimony: Nonproliferation and the G-8
    Jon Wolfsthal July 4, 2005 June 30

    If the leading economic powers cannot demonstrate the urgency of the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, then we have little hope of preventing those who seek to use nuclear capabilities against us from succeeding. We have to remember that there are no good responses once a nuclear weapon or enough material to produce one goes missing.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Collective Wisdom
    Joshua Williams June 28, 2005

    On June 27, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an extension of the 9/11 Commission, heard urgent testimony from three of America’s top proliferation experts. Convening in Washington, D.C., former Senator Sam Nunn, Harvard University’s Ashton Carter, and Monterrey Institute Deputy Director Leonard Spector made independent but complementary recommendations on how to better protect the United States from the threats of a nuclear terrorist attack and the global spread of nuclear weapons.

    Responding to the testimony, Carnegie Endowment Director for Non-Proliferation Joseph Cirincione said, "If we would implement these recommendations over the next four years, America would be far safer than we have been in the four years since 9/11." The proposals made by these experts parallel many of the policies detailed in the recent Carnegie study, Universal Compliance. A summary of their recommendations follows. (Read More)

     
  • Testimony
    Pathways to the Bomb: Security of Fissile Materials Abroad
    Rose Gottemoeller June 28, 2005

    The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is a program of great promise, but just over a year after its launch, it needs attention and firm hands if it is to fulfill that promise.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Talk Now, Talk Fast on North Korea
    Jon Wolfsthal June 22, 2005

    There are signs that the Six Party talks between the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia on North Korea’s nuclear program could soon resume. But holding talks while North Korea continues to expand its nuclear capabilities is like negotiating with a gun to your head.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The Media and the Downing Street Memos
    Joseph Cirincione June 21, 2005

    Press inquiries into the Downing Street memos are increasing after most media ignored the story for weeks.  The documents show that British officials at the highest levels believed that President Bush had decided to invade Iraq almost a year before he told the American public of his decision and that “intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”  If true, this explains why intelligence assessments in 2002 shifted dramatically in certainty and specificity from all previous assessments.  A refreshingly candid look at the issue and the media coverage comes from Michael Smith, a reporter for the Sunday Times of London, who has led the coverage, starting with his report of the Downing Street Memo on May 1.  We provide excerpts from his on-line chat for The Washington Post from Thursday, June 16. (Read More)

     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

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  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

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  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

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  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Lindsay Rand
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Lindsay Rand is a Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie Europe

    Sinan Ülgen is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

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