Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Proliferation Analysis
    Update: Indian Questioning of US-India Nuclear Deal
    Anirudh Suri August 17, 2006

    On July 26, the US House of Representatives passed the “United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006” by a clear majority. The Senate version of the Bill will be voted upon, most likely, in September. The House of Representatives adopted the Bill only after ensuring that even after being passed by the Senate and the enactment of the Act into law, the nuclear cooperation agreement would still need the approval of the Congress, thus maintaining its full oversight authority.

    The House also demanded periodic reporting from the President on India’s compliance with key U.S. objectives in the region as well as on issues of non-proliferation. In two non-binding sections included in the Bill, the “Sense of the House” and “Statements of Policy,” the House outlined key U.S. interests including, but not limited to : (i) the achievement of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for production of nuclear weapons; (ii) securing India’s full support of and participation in U.S. efforts to deter and possibly isolate and sanction Iran for its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons; and (iii) a complete declaration of India’s civil nuclear facilities to the IAEA as well as a safeguards regime in perpetuity in conformity with IAEA’s practices, standards and principles,  rather than an India-specific safeguards regime.

    These modifications have generated apprehension on the Indian side. Among the political parties, the CPI (M), a key leftist ally of the ruling Congress government with a traditionally anti-US stance, has expressed a heightened sense of concern about the deal’s impact on India’s ability to continue to pursue an independent foreign policy. The Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has also voiced similar concerns. On August 10th, the BJP announced that former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee would lead a delegation of Parliamentarians to President Abdul Kalam to seek his intervention to prevent the passage of a deal that they believed would compromise India’s ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Sensing an opportunity to rally all the parties in opposition to the deal against the ruling Congress, the BJP also invited the Left, including CPI (M) to support this move. (Read More)

     
  • Article
    Inside the A.Q. Khan Network
    George Perkovich August 9, 2006

    Rather than being primarily composed of a shadowy subversive network of international terrorists, most of the central players in the A.Q. Khan proliferation network were well-to-do Anglo-Saxons. They were clever and exploited voids in national and international export control laws to sell their wares. Greed was their central motivation.

     
  • Op-Ed
    On Iran, Giving Futility Its Chance
    Robert Kagan July 13, 2006 Washington Post
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Why Iran Should Suspend First

    In the latest move in the wrestling match with the international community, Iran is being pushed back to the UN Security Council.  Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate over the recent international incentive package was too much for France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and even Russia and China to take.  This is not the last move, however, and it is important that the international community not waver on the need for Iran to  resume without further delay suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.

    We say this because in Washington and elsewhere, the erroneous and unhelpful impression was being promoted that the United States is the actor holding up negotiations with Iran.  Seymour Hersh’s insightful article in the July 10 & 17 issue of The New Yorker begins by reporting that the Bush Administration’s offer to join talks with Iran was conditioned on the President’s demand that “‘the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.’”  Hersh continues that in essence “Iran, which has insisted on the right to enrich uranium, was being asked to concede the main point of negotiations before they started.”  Herein lies a damaging fallacy.

    The facts are that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors has called for Iranian suspension nine times in resolutions between September 2003 and February 2006, and the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of March 29, 2006 also calls for Iran to re-establish “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development”.  In each case, the demand is for immediate Iranian suspension.  The logic follows the November 15, 2004 Paris Agreement between the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Iran, whereby Iran agreed that “the suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements”. The aim of the agreement was to provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, while meeting Iran’s interests in developing peaceful nuclear technology and gaining the economic benefits of ties with Europe and the security benefits of broader rapprochement in the Middle East.  Iran broke that suspension last August before it bothered to consider an offer of incentives by the EU-3.  It is risible that Iran now says it needs months to analyze and respond to the more ambitious incentive package offered by the EU-3 and supported by the US, Russia and China. 

    In other words, the call for Iran to suspend enrichment now is an international demand, not an exceptional American one, and it does not prejudge the outcome of subsequent negotiations.  (Read More)

     
  • Book
    Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.–Russian Equation
    Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin July 1, 2006 Washington

    While deterrence as a concept has always been paradoxical, it is poorly equipped to handle today’s most significant nuclear challenges: proliferation and terrorism. Nuclear arms control must move beyond the deadlock of deterrence.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    New Report Addresses Critiques of U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
    Caterina Dutto June 27, 2006

    In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limit India's potential nuclear arsenal and that any limitations in India's nuclear fuel stockpile stem from short-term problems that, in fact, give the U.S. little leverage over India.  Tellis argues that Indian policy-makers display no intention nor practice of dramatically building up their nuclear weapon arsenal and that the proposed U.S.-India deal will not cause India to do so or augment its capacity to do so in significant ways.

     

    The report states that India is not seeking to maximize its nuclear arsenal as demonstrated by India’s decision to produce far less fissile material than its capacity allows given its natural uranium reserves. Tellis argues that India’s short-term deficiency of uranium fuel is due to technical hindrances in its uranium mining and milling practices. He maintains that India has the capability to rectify this shortcoming independently.

     

    Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse with India whatsoever, because the resulting gains from trade would inevitably free up some domestic Indian resources that would be of use to New Delhi’s weapons program.”

     

    To access the full report, click here

     
  • Event
    Carnegie Foreign Policy Conference: Managing U.S. Dominance
    Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Robert Gallucci, Paul Pillar June 20, 2006 Washington, D.C.

    The class of 2005-2006 Carnegie Junior Fellows were proud to present the first annual conference for young professionals, The Carnegie Foreign Policy Conference: Managing U.S. Dominance. Speakers remarked on the recent historical context of America's position in the world and idenified some of the debates that today's younger generation will be faced with over the course of their careers.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Israel Urges U.S. Diplomacy on Iran
    Ze'ev Schiff May 30, 2006

    Many observers believe that Israel is pushing the U.S. to take military action against Iran's nuclear program. We asked Israel's senior defense journalist, Ze'ev Schiff, a man with outstanding contacts, to describe Israeli establishment thinking today on the Iran challenge.

    When in Washington, I was amazed to hear on a number of occasions that Israel was urging the United States to go to war with Iran and that its strategic objective was to induce the United States to attack Iran, thus putting an end to that country's nuclear program. To the best of my knowledge and understanding this claim is totally false. It is an error based on ignorance or on disregard for important details in Israeli strategic thinking. It may even be founded on a deliberate lie.

    To the best of my knowledge, Israel does not believe war against Iran to be the best way to eliminate the Iranian nuclear project. There is a common tendency to forget that Israel lies on the frontline of such a war. Israel stands to suffer more than anyone else, including the United States, should such a war break out. It would certainly be the prime target of Iranian retaliation should the United States decide to use force against Iran. It is a known fact that the attack on the Israeli consulate in Buenos Aires some years ago was the work of Iranian agents. Also in Buenos Aires, Iranian agents were responsible for the destruction of the Jewish community offices, causing many casualties. In fact, the Iranian government aims its violence against Jewish institutions in countries outside the Middle East. (Read More)

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Testimony by Patrick Clawson: More Subtle Pressure and Inducements Needed for Iran
    Patrick Clawson May 30, 2006

    The following are excerpts from the prepared remarks by Patrick Clawson, deputy director at The Washington Institute, on "Iran's Motives and Strategies: The Role of the Economy" delivered at a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on May 17, 2006. Click here to access his full testimony.


    The Limitations of Economic Instruments

    Economic instruments alone are unlikely to be sufficient to persuade Iran to freeze its nuclear program. The principal levers of power in Iran are in the hands of revolutionaries who are not motivated primarily by economic concerns, while those who care about the state of the economy do not have sufficient influence on their own to persuade the real power-holders to change policies. Success at influencing Iranian policy is much more likely if action on the economic front is combined with action on other fronts...

    Much as pressure should be applied on several fronts rather than just on the economy, so inducements offered Iran should take multiple forms rather than only being trade and investment incentives. Indeed, economic inducements look suspiciously like bribes paid for bad behavior. Besides being odious, such bribes give the impression that bad behavior is more profitable than good behavior...

    A much more appropriate form of inducement would be security inducements. Such security inducements should be designed to counter the argument that Iran needs nuclear weapons for its defense. There are many confidence- and security-building measures and arms control measures that would provide gains for both Iran and the West, similar to the way such steps reduced tensions between the old Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. One example would be an agreement to reduce the risk of incidents at sea between the U.S. and Iranian navies.

    A further security inducement which the United States could offer would be to address the reported concern that the Bush administration's real goal is regime change in Iran and that the Bush administration will use force to that end. Such complaints sound peculiar coming from an Iranian government whose president lectures President Bush on why the United States should abandon its liberal democracy and who sponsored a conference last fall on theme "The World Without Zionism and America"...

    It would of course be inappropriate for the U.S. government to offer any security guarantees to the Iranian or any other government; what government is in power in another country is up to the people of that country to decide. But what Washington could offer Tehran would be a "conditional security assurance" -- jargon for the simple proposition, "We will not attack you if you do not attack us." (Read More)

     
  • Event
    Congressional Progressive Caucus Forum on Iran and Preemption
    Jessica Tuchman Mathews May 24, 2006 Washington, D.C.

    Carnegie President Jessica Tuchman Mathews discusses U.S.-Iran Relations and whether war with Iran would help or hurt U.S. national security.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis
    Alexey Arbatov May 23, 2006

    At first glance, Russia's current position on the Iranian nuclear crisis is quite controversial.

     
  • Article
    Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis
    Alexei Arbatov May 23, 2006

    At first glance, Russia's current position on the Iranian nuclear crisis is quite controversial.

     
  • Event
    U.S.-India Relations: The Global Partnership
    R. Nicholas Burns, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, George Perkovich, Ashley J. Tellis, Albert Thibault May 16, 2006 Washington, D.C.

    Burns, Thibault, Markey, Tellis, & Perkovich discussed 'U.S.-India Relations: The Global Partnership'
    VideoFeatures event audio and video

     
  • Other Publications
    A Realist Case for Conditioning the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
    George Perkovich May 15, 2006 Working paper prepared for a NPEC Seminar

    The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration and the government of India is too narrow, focusing on the nonproliferation aspects of the deal and leaving larger strategic questions relatively unexamined. This is ironic, as the best argument for the deal is that it advances big strategic goals.

     
  • Testimony
    Is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in crisis? If so, why? Are there remedies?
    Pierre Goldschmidt May 11, 2006 Charlottesville Committee on Foreign Relations Speech

    The international community should stand back and reflect on the lessons learned from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) experience in implementing safeguards over the last decade, particularly in North Korea and Iran. Such review and reflection suggests that just when safeguards are getting better, the political will to use them effectively seems to be waning.

     
  • Testimony
    The U.S.-India ''Global Partnership'': Legislative Options
    Ashley J. Tellis May 11, 2006 House Committee on International Relations

    The agreement on civil nuclear cooperation that presently exists between the United States and India was the only accord possible because it remains the only framework that protects the core national security interests of both sides.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Bush Should Engage Iranian President in Dialogue, Not Back Away
    George Perkovich May 10, 2006 Council on Foreign Relations Interview

    President Mahmoud Amadinejad of Iran sent a letter to President Bush raising questions about American "justice" and questioning whether the United States or Iran is more righteous. This letter should be answered in kind by the Bush administration. Unfortunately, there is likely to be no such reply.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    The U.S.-India Deal: Can An Asian Nuclear Build Up Be Avoided?
    George Perkovich May 9, 2006

    The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration and the government of India is too narrow. If other alternatives are not explored, there is a risk that Asia will experience a dangerous and costly build up of nuclear arsenals – a nuclear bubble much more dangerous than housing or stock market bubbles.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Ahmadinejad's Letter to Bush
    George Perkovich May 9, 2006

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent the following letter to President George Bush.  The unorthodox letter contains no concrete diplomatic proposals, but it does suggest Ahmadinejad's confidence that by championing a moral, religious, political, and economic critique against U.S. ideology and policies he can tap populist passions swelling not only in the Middle East and other Muslim societies but also in Latin America.  Ahmadinejad is inviting a contest over whether the positions he and Iran pursue are more just than those of the Bush Administration.  The U.S. should not ignore this challenge, but rather take it head on. In the Foreign Affairs article, "Giving Justice Its Due," (July/August 2005), George Perkovich suggested some ways in which the U.S. could address growing international demands for justice to complement the "freedom doctrine." We have provided the full text of Ahmadinejad's letter to President Bush. (Read More)

     
  • Op-Ed
    The Russia Card
    Rose Gottemoeller May 3, 2006 New York Times
     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

  •  
  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

  •  
  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

  •  
  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is the Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

  •  
  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Visiting Scholar
    Carnegie Europe

    Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

  •  
  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

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