Nuclear Policy

 
 

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  • Proliferation Analysis
    ElBaradei Remarks at Georgetown University
    Caterina Dutto October 24, 2006

    IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressed a wide range of nonproliferation challenges yesterday in a conversation with Robert Gallucci at Georgetown University.

     
  • TV/Radio Broadcast
    Debating a Nuclear Iran
    George Perkovich October 20, 2006 National Public Radio
     
  • Op-Ed
    Book Review: Cracking the Arms Race
    George Perkovich October 17, 2006 The Washington Post

    If A.Q. Khan is written off as an evil individual, then his deeds can be written off as peculiar sins that do not reflect flaws in the international system. In a review of Gordon Corera’s book, “Shopping for Bombs”, George Perkovich examines its key theme – nuclear proliferation can occur within the limits of international criminal law.

     
  • Event
    Next Steps on North Korea: Options Beyond Sanctions
    Michael D. Swaine, Randall Schriver, Alan Romberg October 12, 2006 Washington, D.C.

    Carnegie hosted a discussion, “Next Steps on North Korea: Options Beyond Sanctions” with Randy Schriver, a founding partner of Armitage International LLC and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Alan D. Romberg, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center.  Carnegie Senior Associate Michael Swaine moderated the discussion.

     
  • Op-Ed
    The Risk of Nuclear Anarchy
    George Perkovich October 10, 2006 The Nation Online

    Leaders in Washington and, indeed, Moscow, Paris, Beijing, Tel Aviv, Islamabad, Pyongyang and perhaps other capitals see their nuclear arsenals more as valued assets than as problems to be eliminated. With the exception of George Bush and Tony Blair in their campaign to disarm and liberate Iraq, leaders of nuclear powers have for years lacked strength, vision and boldness.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    U.S. Leadership with China, South Korea and Japan Key to Containing Nuclear Chain Reaction
    George Perkovich October 9, 2006

    North Korea recently tested a nuclear weapon. The United States must now take the lead in intense diplomacy to prevent a chain reaction in the nuclear arena.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Red Scare
    Josh Kurlantzick October 9, 2006 The New Republic (online)
     
  • Event
    Nuclear Energy and U.S.-Russian Cooperation
    October 3, 2006 Washington, D.C.

    Despite the popular narrative, US-Russian relations are generally good. They have undergone and are undergoing dramatic changes, but the relationship is maturing from an overly romantic partnership to a more pragmatic one. Most people speak of this change to a more “selective partnership” as a tragedy, but in reality, it is a natural evolution.

     
  • Event
    Beyond Nuclear Deterence: Transforming the US-Russia Equation
    Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, John Steinbruner, Rose Gottemoeller September 20, 2006

    Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin discussed their new book on the nuclear relations of Russia and the US.

     
  • Event
    Iran's Nuclear Ambitions
    Shahram Chubin, George Perkovich September 18, 2006 Washington, D.C.

    Wednesday, September 13, 2006

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Defining Iran's Nuclear Rights
    George Perkovich September 7, 2006

    Iranian officials and commentators have masterfully and incorrectly defined the crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities.  Instead of being about Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and subsequent refusal to answer key questions needed for the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the story has become the United States’ bloody minded crusade to deny Iran its nuclear rights.  This story needs to be corrected.

    Iran, like all countries, has a right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty”  Under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Iran can expect international cooperation in exercising such rights.

    However, there is no explicit right to possess uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technology, just as there is not a specific prohibition on possessing such technology.  The rules to guide the international management of nuclear technology have evolved through negotiation and custom.  In all cases,  rights under the NPT are conditioned on the obligation “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons…; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.” (Article II)

    (Read More)

     
  • Book
    Iran's Nuclear Ambitions
    Shahram Chubin September 5, 2006 Washington

    The central problem with Iran is not its nuclear technology but rather Iran’s behavior as a revolutionary state with ambitions that collide with the interests of its neighbors and the West.

     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    All Eyes on the Senate as India Plays Hardball
    Anirudh Suri August 29, 2006

    Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently made speeches in the Rajya Sabha (August 17th) and the Lok Sabha (August 23rd), the two Houses of India’s Parliament, forcefully defending the merits of the India-US nuclear deal and clearly outlining the Indian Government’s position on various aspects of the deal. Facing criticism from opposition parties as well as the Left, Singh addressed all the concerns in turn and claimed that he had the assurance of President Bush that the final India-US nuclear deal would not represent any shifts away from the goalposts established in the agreement of July 18, 2005.

    In his speeches, Singh emphatically stated that India would not bend in the face of US pressure and would not accept any conditions that would go beyond the July 18th Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. Strongly refuting the claim that the proposed US Bill, as passed by the House of Representatives, could become an instrument to influence or even dictate Indian foreign policy, Singh asserted that “the thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion of our national interest.”

    In unequivocal terms, Singh further declared that India was “not willing to accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material” and that India was not “prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July statement.” Singh made it clear that the Indian Government would not accept any “dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation.” He also rejected the Senate proposal that requires the US President to report on India’s compliance with non-proliferation and other commitments on an annual basis, saying that the “element of uncertainty regarding future cooperation” was not acceptable to India. Addressing the issue of India’s nuclear weapons program being subject to international safeguards, Singh further clarified that the Indian government has registered strong opposition to “any legislative provisions that mandate scrutiny of either our nuclear weapons programme or our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” As a sovereign nation, India was in no way bound by the legislation of any other country, Singh declared. (Read More)

     
  • Op-Ed
    U.S. Needs ''Conversation'' With Putin on Iran Sanctions
    George Perkovich August 28, 2006 Council on Foreign Relations
     
  • Op-Ed
    US-Russia: Holding the line against nukes
    Rose Gottemoeller August 25, 2006 International Herald Tribune
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    Iran after the Lebanon War: Same Nuclear Ambitions, Different Regional Context
    Emily B. Landau August 24, 2006

    As the August 31 deadline for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities approaches, Iran remains defiant and determined to not give up its right to engage in these activities. While the war in Lebanon was raging and the UN Security Council took a firmer stance on the nuclear issue, statements from Iran clarified that, far from suspension, Iran plans to expand its enrichment activities.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Iran’s Lebanon Card
    George Perkovich August 24, 2006 Yale Global Online

    The futures of Lebanon and nuclear weapons in the Middle East now intertwine, and Iran is the common link. But Tehran will rebuff pressure in one area by indirectly threatening to make things worse in the other. Iran’s counterparts must step back and develop a more comprehensive diplomatic strategy.

     
  • Op-Ed
    Diplomacy for Now
    George Perkovich August 24, 2006 The Wall Street Journal

    Iran has said no to the U.N. Security Council's legally binding demand that Tehran suspend enrichment of uranium, as a first step toward resuming negotiations over the future course of its nuclear-energy program and broader relations with the West. It's now time for the U.S. to quietly rally Europe, the Middle East and Asia to develop plans for containing and deterring a nuclear-armed Iran.

     
  • TV/Radio Broadcast
    Iran and the Nuclear Deal
    George Perkovich August 23, 2006 The Diane Rehm Show
     
  • Proliferation Analysis
    UN Resolution 1696 Moots Iranian Legal Claims
    Amy Reed August 21, 2006

    On July 31, 2006 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” The resolution came after Iran had ignored a series of requests from the IAEA, the EU-3, and the United States for Iran to cease its enrichment program until its peaceful nature could be confirmed by the IAEA. Iran claimed that neither the IAEA nor any member of the international community had the right to prevent Iran from pursuing a domestic nuclear energy program. Resolution 1696 undermines the legal basis on which Iran has resisted suspension. As the international community awaits Iran’s response to the Security Council’s demands, it is important to understand this new legal context.

    1696 was adopted after three years of negotiations between Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom failed to resolve outstanding questions regarding Iran’s compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations and its Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons obligation under Article II “not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Throughout these negotiations, Iran has been pressed to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as a confidence-building measure to facilitate negotiations over longer-term parameters to objectively guarantee that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran agreed as a voluntary, unilateral measure in November 2003 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. It then intermittently broke the terms of the suspension until November 2004, when a more specific agreement was made with the EU-3. Iran then breached that agreement on August 10, 2005 when it removed the IAEA seals from its conversion plant in Esfahan in preparation for manufacturing UF6 gas to be enriched. (Read More)

     
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Carnegie Experts on Nuclear Policy

  • James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Fiona Cunningham
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.

  •  
  • Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

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  • Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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  • Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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  • Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

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  • Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

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  • Jamie Kwong
    Stanton Pre-Doctoral Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Jamie Kwong is the Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Technology and International Affairs Program

    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.

  •  
  • Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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  • George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies

    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.

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  • Sinan Ülgen
    Visiting Scholar
    Carnegie Europe

    Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.

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  • Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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  • Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program

    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  •  
  • Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie China

    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program.

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