Rules for the Nuclear Renaissance was part of Carnegie's 2007 Nonproliferation Conference. It was chaired by Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment; Peter Bradford, formerly with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Charles Ferguson, Council on Foreign Relations;Corey Hinderstein, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference Panel: Implementing International Measures to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Chair: William Potter, Monterey Institute of International Studies; Ambassador Peter Burian, Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the United Nations; Igor Khripunov, University of Georgia; William Tobey, U.S. Department of Energy.
2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference Panel: Are Sanctions Effective? Chair: Thomas Biersteker, Brown University; Paula DeSutter, U.S. Department of State; Shen Dingli, Fudan University; Skip Fischer, U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
United Nations Resolution 1540 would make proliferation more difficult and less attractive, facilitate the dismantlement of proliferation networks, and create momentum to strengthen other aspects of the nonproliferation regime—but major challenges preventing actual implementation need to be comprehensively addressed.
A team of leading nonproliferation experts offers a blueprint for rethinking the international nonproliferation regime. They offer a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and fissile materials through a twenty-step, priority action agenda.
In a provocative new policy brief, Ashley Tellis challenges the conventional wisdom that China’s antisatellite test (ASAT) was a protest against U.S. space policy, arguing instead that it was part of a loftier strategy to combat U.S. military superiority and one that China will not trade away in any arms-control regime.
Carnegie Proliferation News Archive
Those who favor a diplomatic solution to the present crisis over Iran's nuclear ambitions should nevertheless realize that to ignore Iran’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions is to tacitly support it, and doing so weakens the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and, in the end, increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, tensions, and violence in the region and beyond.
Reading William Langewiesche's new book is like going to a concert and discovering that your favorite rock star is having an off night. The sublime talent rings through in a few electric riffs. The voice registers the deep truth of heavy experience in two or three places. But the show doesn't hold together from start to finish.
Some issues surrounding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty deserve new attention. The future of verification and transparency is especially fertile ground and demands attention, given the Bush administration’s preference to see START and its verification protocol go out of force at the end of 2009.
Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was in Washington last week to save the troubled U.S.-India nuclear deal. U.S. negotiators should ensure that the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement meets the letter and spirit of that law. Anything Less should be rejected by Congress.
George Perkovich says there is no question that Iran has not complied yet with the IAEA investigation into its nuclear activities despite its claims to the contrary. He predicts that if pressure from the UN Security Council and others persists, in time a “core” group in Iran may agree to suspend uranium enrichment, opening the door to possible agreements across the board on a number of issues.
Iran is becoming more isolated because of its refusal to take steps to build international confidence that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes.
On March 20, 2007, Dr. Dunn presented the findings of the SAIC report, Foreign Perspectives on U.S Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications. report was sponsored by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The report covers foreign perceptions of U.S. nuclear posture and policy since the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
(The following op-ed by Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, first appeared in Defense News on March 5, 2007.)
Following the end of U.S. nuclear testing a decade and a half ago, some scientists and policy-makers worried that the reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads could diminish as their plutonium cores age. They claimed it would take a decade or more to see if the nation’s weapon laboratories could maintain the existing stockpile of well-tested but aging weapons without further nuclear blasts.
Such concerns led many senators to withhold their support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999.
Time has addressed the skeptics’ concerns. For more than a decade, a multibillion-dollar Stockpile Stewardship program has successfully maintained the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of testing. As the importance of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy has diminished, there has been no need to test new types of nukes.
But now, the Bush administration is asking Congress to fund an ambitious effort to build new replacement warheads, which it claims is needed to avoid plutonium aging problems that could reduce weapon reliability. (Read More)
Russia's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty - an important and successful component of the arms control regime - threatens nonproliferation goals. Rather than unilaterally withdrawing, Russia should request exceptions to accomodate its concerns.
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