Ulrich Kühn

Nonresident Scholar
Nuclear Policy Program
tel +49 40 866 077 41
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
 

Education

PhD, Political Sciences, Hamburg University

Languages

English; German

 

Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Previously, he was a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. He holds a PhD (summa cum laude) in political sciences from Hamburg University, an MA in Peace Research and Security Policy from Hamburg University, and a Magister Artium in medieval and newer history as well as German literature from the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University Bonn. His current research focuses on NATO-Russian relations, transatlantic security, nuclear and conventional deterrence and arms control, and the proceedings of the OSCE.

Kühn worked for the German Federal Foreign Office and was awarded United Nations Fellow on Disarmament in 2011. He is the founder and a permanent member of the trilateral Deep Cuts Commission and an alumnus of the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius.

His articles and commentary have appeared in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Washington Quarterly, and War on the Rocks.

  • Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History January 13, 2021
    Back to the Future? The New Missile Crisis

    After the end of the INF Treaty, the United States and its Allies in Europe and East Asia face a choice of what to do to enhance security: give arms control another chance or provide the ground for another missile buildup.

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  • Russian Analytical Digest January 5, 2021
    Strategic Stability in the 21st Century

    Strategic Stability in the 21st Century needs to be rethought in order to involve all relevant actors and to meet new technological challenges.

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  • Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic
    UNIDIR November 9, 2020
    Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic

    Nuclear risk reduction efforts in the Euro-Atlantic should begin with the Russian Federation and the United States ensuring they retain what is left of nuclear arms control and transparency.

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  • Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw U.S. Nuclear Weapons From Europe
    Arms Control Today October 20, 2020
    Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw U.S. Nuclear Weapons From Europe

    The United States could withdraw the tactical weapons it deploys in Europe with no negative consequences for NATO unity and the security of Europe. In order to secure such an outcome, German leaders and NATO policymakers will have to combine reassurance and arms control in novel and smart ways.

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  • Uncharted Waters: Europe and the End of Nuclear Arms Control
    Turkish Policy Quarterly September 4, 2020
    Uncharted Waters: Europe and the End of Nuclear Arms Control

    The end of the INF Treaty and debates over NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements could spell the end of nuclear arms control.

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  • Nuclear Risk in the Euro-Atlantic
    United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research April 20, 2020
    Nuclear Risk in the Euro-Atlantic

    Risks of nuclear weapon use in the Euro-Atlantic region have grown, but policymakers have not yet correctly assessed which risks they should be most concerned about.

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  • Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives From Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
    IFSH March 19, 2020
    Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives From Washington, Moscow, and Beijing

    As the world enters an age of seemingly unconstrained great power competition, arms control between Russia, China, and the United States could help strengthen arms race and crisis stability and provide a platform for strategic dialogue.

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  • Why Arms Control Is (Almost) Dead
    Strategic Europe March 5, 2020
    Why Arms Control Is (Almost) Dead

    The next arms control agreement will have to include more actors and weapons platforms across multiple domains—as well as more effort from middle-sized powers to act where the so-called big ones won’t act anymore.

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  • The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe
    Nomos February 21, 2020
    The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe

    The current confrontation between NATO and Russia stems from a long stagnation and then final crisis in the realm of arms control.

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  • Non-Proliferation and Emerging Technologies: Interview with Ulrich Kühn
    EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium October 23, 2019
    Non-Proliferation and Emerging Technologies

    Policymakers are under the false impression that they are coming too late and that there is no time for regulating new dual-use technologies. But that impression is misleading.

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  • All Things Policy May 13, 2020
    Going Conventional: Europe and the Future of Arms Control

    The death of nuclear arms control seems imminent. But what about conventional arms?

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  • Of Nightclub Bouncers and Arms Control
    International Crisis Group February 10, 2020
    Of Nightclub Bouncers and Arms Control

    The world has entered an age of regression of predictability in the international military balance. What does this mean for those countries who depend on cooperative mechanisms, but who have little say in what happens to them?

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  • CSIS August 11, 2017
    Of Nuclear Weapons and Deadly Misconceptions

    Uncertainty swirls around the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship in light of new questions concerning Russian nuclear force advancement and the U.S. response.

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  • March 28, 2018 Washington, DC
    Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook

    In a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Baltic, the risks of escalation leading to nuclear use—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—would be dangerously high. NATO must enhance deterrence against Russia while simultaneously pursuing resilience and risk-reduction measures.

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Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=1265

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